

ALIYEVA-MAMMADOVA GUNEL

**FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY
AT THE PRESENT STAGE
(1990-2019)**

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(EDITORIAL GUIDE)

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SCIENTIFIC EDITOR:

PH.D. ON HISTORY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR

AGAYEV IGBAL

HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES OF BSU

REVIEWERS:

DOCTOR OF HISTORICAL SCIENCES, PROFESSOR

GADJIYEV SANI

RESEARCHER OF NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF
AZERBAIJAN, INSTITUTE OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORIOGRAPHY
AND SOURCE STUDIES

BAYRAM QULIYEV

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INTRODUCTION

After the collapse of the USSR, Turkey announced the beginning of a multi-vector policy. During these years, the country has stepped up its foreign policy in the Middle East, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and also in the Far East. As we know, foreign policy is the activity of the state in the international arena, and the essence of foreign policy is the ability of the state to defend national interests. Thus, in the 90s. of the XX century, Turkey becomes a conductor of Western ideas and American interests in the newly formed countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

At this time, there was a tendency for the world community, including Turkey, to move towards a unipolar world order with the US dominance, which practically controlled all major international political and financial organizations. As the world's leading political, economic, and military power, the United States sought to maintain and consolidate its global leadership in the long run, while realizing the growing importance of regional states, including Turkey.

In favorable circumstances, the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) proclaimed a pretentious goal - the transformation of Turkey into one of the leading world powers.

In Turkey's foreign policy, the neo-Ottoman project "zero problems with neighbors" was adopted by Ahmet Davutoglu (former Turkish Prime Minister in 2014-2016) and also in territories formerly part of the Ottoman Empire. So, the project of "zero problems with neighbors" and "creation of a stability zone around Turkey" became the basic principle for Turkey. With all this, the ruling party has a political strategy that is based on four principles.

1) AKP is trying to appear as a "caring" organization for efficiency and innovation are not alien in the process of satisfying people's needs;

2) AKP is actively pursuing a policy of providing services to voters. It focuses on overcoming poverty and helping the most disadvantaged sections of society, which distinguishes it from the ruling parties and coalitions of the past;

3) AKP vigorously promotes policies aimed at developing Turkish industry based on financial stability and a strong economy;

4) AKP works to increase the global attractiveness of Turkey, changing the orientation of foreign policy - from the West to the East and South.

For example, throughout history with Iran, Turkey has had very complex and strained relations. Today, we can see the trend of rapprochement between these two countries. One of the main factors that have a strong impact on Iran's stance on Turkey is the Syrian crisis. Iran's participation in this crisis is both political and military.

The attitude of the Iranian leadership towards Turkey is also positively influenced by Turkey's position regarding US anti-Iranian sanctions. In August 2018, Turkish Foreign Minister M. Chavushoglu reiterated that "we will not apply US sanctions against Iran." It is also obvious that the presence of the Kurdish problem brings the two countries closer together.

In the direction of Israel, at the beginning of the 21st century (in the 2010 "Mavi Marmara" incident) the situation changed, and Turkey's tough stance towards this country helped the Turkish leadership to receive significant support in the Islamic world, primarily from the Arab countries. With the beginning of the Arab Spring, Ankara tried to establish itself as the leader of the world Sunni ummah, responsible for peace and stability in the Middle East. This, of course, caused dissatisfaction with the regional leaders - Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

In the Syrian direction, Ankara actively used the religious factors of its foreign policy even before open intervention in the armed conflict (military operations - "The Euphrates Shield", "Olive Branch", "Source of Peace"). The turning point in Turkish foreign policy was the decision of Recep Erdogan, when he entered on a demonstrative conflict with Donald Trump over the purchase of Russian S-400s. When the American leadership threatened the Turks with sanctions, they immediately raised the question of the continued existence of US military bases in Turkey. For the US, military bases, especially in Incirlik, are very important. After all,

Turkey has a special strategic position in the region and this allows us to control the Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. Erdogan believes that Ankara, not Moscow or Washington, should play a paramount role in foreign policy issues in the Middle East, especially in those countries that were once part of the Ottoman Empire.

In general, transforming the country's foreign policy on the basis of Davutoglu concept was able to refute the opinion of many analysts who believed that with the end of the Cold War, Turkey would inevitably turn from a flanking NATO country into a peripheral one.

A consistent balanced policy, coordinated by Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu, President Erdogan and Foreign Minister Cavusoglu, is turning Turkey into a key country in the region.

Turkey's foreign policy is taking shape, which in near future will significantly affect the strategic balance of all Middle East region. Turkey's operation in Syria (the "Olive Branch") against Kurdish militias, which are pro-American in their foreign policy orientation, once again proves the presence of negative dynamics in Turkish-American relations. Arming Kurdish self-defense units that have been a direct threat to Turkey's national security for years, Washington risks losing a strategic ally in the region.

It seems that Turkey is trying to gain a realistic and rational vision of its special role in the region, its importance for integration and stability in it - and, consequently, for its own integration and political stability.

Thanks to the new foreign policy direction, "soft power", which implies the ability to achieve the goal by influencing the behavior of other actors, not through coercion, but through cooperation and conviction, the foundations of a multi-vector policy of Turkey are being developed.

It is safe to say that at the present stage, Turkey is increasingly strengthening its positions not only within the region, but also beyond its borders, and this is possible, is already leading to the creation of a multipolar world, and the emergence of absolute darkness in the Middle East political picture of the "American street".

CHAPTER I: THE PLACE OF CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA REGION IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

The formation of new independent states in Caucasus after the end of the Cold War raised the importance of Ankara, but at the same time created serious risks for it. The disintegration of the USSR saved Turkey from the Soviet / Russian danger, simultaneously created a vacuum of power on its borders.

The emergence of new independent states to the northeast of the country's borders opened up new opportunities for Turkey, but they also became a source of potential and obvious dangers for Turkey. The new role that Turkey could play in the region was widely discussed not only in the country, but also in the West. West countries wanted to induce "new independent states to adopt a new model for themselves," in which democracy is combined with a liberal economy. During these discussions, they constantly mentioned the deep historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties of Turkey with the new independent states of Eurasia.

Ankara reacted to these changes somewhat wary: in the postwar period, because its foreign policy and the entire strategy for ensuring the security of the country was based precisely on the fact that geographical proximity with the Soviet Union made it strategically important for the United States. On the other hand, with the formation of liberal democratic states in Eastern Europe, Western Europe received a buffer zone between itself and Russia, while Turkey "continued to feel threatened by the unpredictable situation that developed in the immediate vicinity of its borders." In a situation where Turkey had to think more and more about its place in the new world order, the emergence of new independent states on its Caucasian borders was perceived as "a challenge and a source of serious concern." When Gorbachev's publicity and restructuring policies revealed the closed Soviet system and the opportunity to establish relations with individual Soviet republics,

Turkey's policy was primarily aimed at avoiding the impression that "it seeks to somehow undermine the integrity of the USSR."

Later, in Turkish policy in the region underwent drastic changes. As a result, she was the first to recognize the independence of new states. After that, Turkey signed protocols with each of them (except Armenia) on establishing diplomatic relations at the diplomatic level. So, by the end of 1991, she completely abandoned the policy of "exclusive orientation toward Moscow" and took the course to actively develop relations with the successor states of the USSR.

As for the United States, the interests of this power in the Caucasus were quite definite. The first step was the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of US embassies in the newly formed states. In 1992, the United States of America began to implement its main program - the Freedom Support Act, designed to meet the needs of the Eurasian countries in the humanitarian sphere, democracy, the creation of a market economy, investments, etc. The United States also hoped for cooperation with Turkey in its regional policy, as the nearest neighbor of the Caucasian republics.

At first, the formation of closer ties was stimulated mainly by cultural, linguistic and religious affinity. Nevertheless, Ankara's new regional policy was based not so much on pure rhetoric or "sentimental motives" as on pragmatic economic and foreign policy calculations. First, the changed international situation unequivocally demanded from Turkey a more active role in the region. It "suddenly found itself at the very center of a new political and economic conglomerate." It was clear that Ankara could play an active role in establishing links between the new independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus with the West, especially the United States.

This role also implied efforts to establish regional cooperation among institutions such as the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. On the other hand, from the strengthening of ties with the new independent states, Turkey

expected to receive substantial economic benefits. Opportunities for regional cooperation in this area were very significant, and with strong state support, the Turkish private sector began to take more and more active steps to use the region's economic potential. We also expected that close ties with this region would give it more weight in regional and global politics. In addition, this expectation was based on the belief that the importance of Turkey was to grow even more because of its generally recognized reputation as a secular and successfully building democracy, and in this capacity able to serve as a development model for the former Soviet republics.

Turkey was also going to strengthen its role in the region; the United States did its best to present its attractive model for the post-Soviet countries, fearing the growth of Islamic fundamentalism among the Muslims of Eurasia, in the vacuum created after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the Times reported on February 17, 1992, "the fear of spreading the ideas of fundamentalism in Central Asia forced Washington to support Ankara's policy towards this region." The "Daily Telegraph" also paid attention to this issue, quoting on February 22, 1993 the then Secretary of State of the United States of America James Baker, who urged Turkmenistan "to follow the example of Turkey, not Iran." Thus, under the influence of growing confidence in its own potential and in political support of the United States, Ankara was ready to use the economic and political opportunities that opened up in the new independent states of Eurasia. After a series of visits of regional leaders to Ankara, Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel made a trip (April 1992) to these countries and offered them import loans and loans totaling \$ 1.1 billion. At the same time, protocols were signed on cooperation in the spheres of culture and economy, which was an unprecedented challenge to Russian interests in the region. The possibility of training military personnel of the Caucasian countries was also discussed.

Turkey also actively lobbied the construction of gas and oil pipelines that would allow the supply of energy resources to the

world market for the countries of the Caspian region through its territory. By mid-1992, Ankara had made a "bold bid" for political, financial, cultural, military and economic influence in the South Caucasus.

However, it soon became clear that Turkey was not the only player striving to fill the vacuum of power in the region. On the contrary, the rivalry for influence in the Caucasus turned into a "big game", and each of its participants - Russian Federation, Iran, the United States and Turkey - was determined to become a key player in it. Each of the states, seeking influence in the region, pursued its own goals, and their rivalry encompassed economic, political, ideological and religious aspects, concealing vast opportunities for expanding the conflict.

The possibility of a military confrontation with Tehran or with Moscow caused serious concern for Turkey. She feared that Iran would try to influence the perception of its identity by Muslims throughout the Caucasus (and Central Asia), the same concern was shared by the United States. Iran, for its part, feared that Turkey's activity in Azerbaijan would lead to the appearance on its northern borders of a Pan-Turkic association under the hegemony of Turkey. Therefore, the unfolding rivalry can be briefly described as the rivalry between two opposing models of political development of the Turkic-Muslim peoples of Eurasia: the secular model with its political pluralism embodied by Turkey and the Islamic model supported by Iran. Iran considered the strengthening of Turkey in the Caucasus a threatening factor.

Tehran was worried about Turkey's cooperation with the US in resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this cooperation, he saw an attempt to pave the way for "the growth of the American presence in the region."

Bogged down in rivalry with Iran for a significant role in the Caucasus, Turkey at the same time did not want to disturb Moscow with signs of too much influence. At first after the collapse of the USSR Moscow did not have a clear policy, soon began to show a keen interest in the region, having designated it

the new term "near abroad". After a short period of self-isolation, Russia took measures to restore its place as the dominant player in the region. These measures quickly put Moscow and Ankara on different sides of the "line of confrontation" in the Caucasus.

Despite the fact that Turkey tried to avoid any involvement in the conflicts in the Caucasus, its steps to establish close relations with the countries of the region forced its rivals to ask: is it seeking regional hegemony and reviving the old pan-Turkism unions? Although Turkish leaders have repeatedly claimed that fears of a revival of pan-Turkism are groundless, neighboring states have been slow to part with their suspicions.

It is true, Turkey tried to form a reliable zone of influence throughout the region and soon Ankara switched its attention to the South Caucasus, a region that promised more opportunities for partnership. An additional incentive for more active participation in the affairs of this region was apart from geographical proximity, the temptation of Caspian energy resources, which had to be delivered to Western markets. Finally, the South Caucasus presented a specific challenge for Turkey, caused by the problem of interethnic conflicts: it became clear that Ankara's positions in the region would be determined by its reaction to local ethnic and national conflicts. In this respect, it is first necessary to note the relations between Turkey and Armenia, which were a difficult issue because of the legacy of mutual distrust between both countries and peoples, as well as historical luggage, from which they failed to free themselves.

Although on December 16, 1991 Turkey recognized Armenia's independence, without any preconditions, the issue of borders between them immediately became a source of contradictions: Yerevan persistently refused to recognize the borders established in accordance with the peace treaty of 1921 between Turkey and the Armenian Republic in the short period its independence.

The Russian-Turkish Treaty of 1921 also contained a clause on the recognition of all borders between the RSFSR and Turkey.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey no longer had a common border with Russia, and the Armenian parliament declared that it does not recognize the borders established by Moscow. As a result, in the spring of 1992 Ankara stated that it was stopping all steps to develop normal diplomatic ties with Yerevan before formal recognition of existing borders, fixed in the relevant document. In addition to the problem of borders, tensions in relations between the two countries are caused by a reference to the so-called "The Armenian Genocide by the Ottoman Empire in 1915" and the efforts of the Armenians to achieve international recognition of the "Armenian genocide". Although then Armenian President L. Ter-Petrosyan, realizing the need to develop relations with Turkey on a realistic basis, did not bring this issue to the official agenda and kept the opportunity for contacts, the situation in the Caucasus and "Karabakh problem" did not allow these relations to develop. From the point of view of Turkey, the conflict was an unacceptable development of events with dangerous consequences. Turkish public opinion urged the government to resolutely stand by Azerbaijan, even directly interfere in the conflict. However, the government did not succumb to this pressure and preferred to mobilize international condemnation of Armenian aggression. Turkey also demonstrated an understanding of the importance of the "American factor" to resolve the conflict and sought to cooperate with the United States, especially within the OSCE. Turkey managed to avoid participation in the military conflict. Throughout the conflict, the policy of Turkey was mainly aimed at preventing political conflicts from escalating this regional conflict to the scale at which it would be transformed into a serious threat to the security of Turkey.

With the coming to power in Armenia on March 1997 of T. Kocharyan, the resumption of contacts between Turkey and Armenia was postponed for an indefinite period. The signing of the "Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation" between Armenia and Russia (1997), as well as the deployment of Russian

troops in the territory of Armenia, divorced Yerevan and Ankara on two opposing unofficial political alliances in the Caucasus: on the one hand, it is the Russian Federation, Armenia and Iran, on the other - the US, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.

As for Azerbaijan and Turkey, from the beginning headed the list of countries with which, according to the forecasts of any expert on the Caucasus, after the end of the Cold War, Turkey had to establish the close connection. These assumptions were equitable, and contacts between Ankara and Baku began to develop: cultural, linguistic, historical ties and general economic, political and strategic interests affected.

With the coming to power of Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan, the sphere of Turkish-American cooperation expanded. In addition, the policy of Haydar Aliyev, who tried to prevent isolation of Russia and Iran in the region, but at the same time firmly adhered to the course of cooperation with the West, "helped Ankara to weaken the confrontation with Moscow, Tehran and Yerevan." This same model of relations persists after Ilham Aliyev came to power in Azerbaijan, whose presidency was welcomed by Turkey and the US as a guarantee of stability in the country.

Speaking at the opening of the summit of the Turkic-speaking countries in Istanbul on July 15-16, 2010, Turkish President Abdullah Gul highly appreciated the integration processes within the framework of cooperation of these states. "Although the geography of our countries has great opportunities for cooperation, but in our region there are also problems that need to be addressed. To this end, the cooperation of our countries is important for our region in the issue of establishing peace and stability. "

After the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, Georgia has also become one of the main and most fruitful areas of Turkish foreign policy. For rapid development of their bilateral relations was facilitated by Georgia's determined opposition to Russian domination in the Caucasus, its support for

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project and its willingness to cooperate with Ankara on the widest range of issues, from tourism to security. Turkey, for its part, sought to strengthen friendly relations, was ready to expand its economic, political and military support to Georgia, which could serve as an anchorage in Caucasus and a gateway to Central Asia. In addition, Turkey, starting cooperation with organization in military education, further in the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace program offered Georgia consultations and assistance in the formation of the national army. After the Russian military contingents were withdrawn territory Georgian, the next step was cooperation in the restoration of the airfield in Marneuli and the military base of Vaziani. These facts were welcomed by the United States.

After the events of September 11, 2001, Georgia was again subjected to Russian pressure, at this time, was accused of the provision the asylum to Chechen fighters, Turkey, with US backing, once again supported Georgia. Thus, the pro-Western orientation of Georgia was finally fixed with the arrival of the military advisers of the United States of America in this country. Along with the four-sided Turkish-American-Georgian-Azerbaijani security cooperation, this has introduced new aspects both to bilateral relations and on a broader scale to Caucasian geopolitics generally.

One of the peculiarities of the Caspian region is that the countries most interested in the exploration and transportation of oil and natural gas are landlocked, and when exporting their oil they depend entirely on the goodwill of their neighbors. In the general line of its geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, Russia insisted that the main route for oil transit from this region is the northern pipeline that runs from Baku to Black Sea port Novorossiysk. If successful, this option would certainly provide Moscow "a monopoly of strategic control over the resources of the region." The US and Turkey, as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan, preferred the route through the territory of Georgia to

the Turkish port of Ceyhan in the Mediterranean, and they did not yield to Russia's demands. Other projects were also developed for transporting Caspian energy resources to the points of sale, but the main competition broke out between these two routes. The issue was not only in the income from the transit of oil and gas that could be extracted by the countries on whose territory the pipelines passed, it is even more important that "the pipeline network is one of the decisive factors for ensuring and maintaining influence throughout Eurasia".

It should also be noted that American private oil companies were most interested in working with Azerbaijan. The work of American oil investors was difficult, given the sharp rivalry with British Petroleum for access to the oil fields of Azerbaijan, and the lack of confidence that was strengthened in connection with the 907th amendment. However, after Heydar Aliyev came to power, the situation changed after long negotiations.

On September 20, 1994, Heydar Aliyev and a consortium of major oil companies gathered in Baku for the ceremony of signing a contract for the exploitation of the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil field, called by local analysts - "The Contract of the Century". This marked the beginning of an official American presence in the region. Twenty-one oil contracts were concluded with 33 companies from fifteen states. Investments were valued 60 billion US dollars in this branch. The "contract of the century" became the political and economic breakthrough of Azerbaijan in the 21st century. In 1995 and 1996 years new contracts were signed to develop oil and gas fields "Karabakh" and "Shahdeniz" in the Azerbaijani sector of Caspian Sea. It became real opportunities for attracting large-scale foreign investments in the oil industry of Azerbaijan. It created the basis for the activities of transnational oil companies engaged in the oil sector.

The primary oil reserves in the Azeri, Chyrag, Guneshli plots covered by the Contract of the Century were valued at 511 million tons, drilling 640 million tons, and associated gas

reserves - 100 billion cubic meters. Investments were valued at \$ 10 billion.

For implementation the "Contract of the Century" was established an Azerbaijani international operating company.

Such active cooperation between the government of Azerbaijan and business circles of the US strengthened Washington's interest in Azerbaijan. The US foreign policy towards the region was more based on energy interest. In addition, such a large and influential company as ATOSO had its own votes in Congress and managed financial levers.

Since January 1995, the US government has provided unlimited support to the project of the Turkish route for the transportation of Caspian oil and gas resources, explaining this not only by the need to ensure regional security, economic independence and trade development, but also "the huge significance of the project for Turkish-American relations in the post-cold War ". In 1998, the growing commitments of President Clinton's administration were manifested in the promulgation of an initiative on the Caspian basin, which was presented by the Caspian Financial Center in Ankara in order to coordinate the actions of export financial agencies in the region. Simultaneously, a special adviser's post was created. The administration then encouraged the President of Turkey and other regional leaders in October 1998 to sign the Ankara Declaration in support of the pipeline project. This event preceded the signing ceremony of the Istanbul Protocol in November 1999 by Turkey and other interested Caspian countries (USA, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan).

The industrial operation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline began in 2005 (the Azerbaijani part) and the main result of it was the weakening of transport dependence primarily of the Caspian region from Russia. Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia entered the market as new competitors of the Russian Federation in the international trade in oil and gas, which gave them the opportunity to use the funds they received to strengthen political

independence from the Kremlin. The role of the Western states, whose oil and gas companies provide the necessary investments, are growing, as is the role of Turkey.

Central Asian policy of Turkey and the USA

The USA foreign policy strategy in the 90s. of the XX century in relation to the countries of Central Asia was based mainly on geopolitical considerations, a direct approach, taking into account its own strategic priorities and interests. These approaches were conditioned by a wide range of elements of relations with Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey.

The United States in the long term wanted to see Central Asia in the sphere of its vital interests, however, in the 90's. XX century, in view of the existing realities, Washington sought to prevent the emergence of states that, due to their potential for emerging political tendencies, could limit or weaken the influence of the US, implying under these countries, most likely the Russian Federation, China and Iran. Therefore, the US began to encourage Turkey's activity in the region, primarily through the prism of the transportation of energy resources in the Turkish direction. It was in some ways the following reasons: internal political character, difficult situation in Turkey, the possibility of strengthening the positions of the clerical forces here, weakening the pro-Western orientation, geostrategic and consideration of Turkey as one of the reliable allies of the United States in Euro-Atlantic cooperation, including NATO, attempts to consolidate behind Ankara the role of a key state in the region of the conductor of Washington's policy.

To a certain extent, the US policy in the region was hostage to the contradictions internal tendencies, developing in politico-informing circles of the United States of America itself. On the other hand, in the United States of America, as in the state, considering himself the bulwark of democracy in the world, the liberal approach has a great influence, based on the desire to support, expand democratic values everywhere, to build relations

with the outside world proceeding from the principle of the so-called. "A democratic standard. These approaches are sometimes strangely reflected in the US foreign policy strategy. This circumstance not seldom caused fair international accusations and criticism to Washington (a policy of "double standard").

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey became persistently to advertise its own model of political development and social modernization as a suitable standard for the Central Asian states. The whole complex both internal and external problems, firstly, in relations with neighboring countries, it shows, that the Central Asian vector of Ankara's policy called up contribute solution of priority foreign policy tasks, facing Turkey.

At the present stage, the main aspect of Turkey's activity remains its desire to become a full member of the Western community, and now - to join the European Union. The political line of Turkey in the region is largely (although not primarily) is conditioned by its desire to strengthen its international image, to show the West expediency of its mediation role in Central Asia, prove the need for its inclusion in Western structures, primarily the EU.

These conclusions can also be made on the basis of the statement of the former chairman of the Turkish government B. Ecevit, in which among the priorities of the foreign policy course are: strengthening of transatlantic cooperation, ties with the US and NATO, integration into the EU and development of comprehensive relations with the Central Asian region.

In the autumn of 1991, took place official visits of the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan to Turkey, as a result of these visits were signed a series of agreements in politics, economy, trade, communications, and training spheres. Establishing direct political contacts, exchange of visits at the highest level (in May 1992, Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel, at the head of a very representative delegation, visited the Turkic republics of Central Asia) contributed to the revitalization of economic ties.

Turkish business people realizing, that the new political situation significantly expands business opportunities and rushed to Central Asia, where they reasonably saw great prospects for marketing Turkish goods and obtaining raw materials.

By state line along with the promotion of trade and economic cooperation was given great importance organization of large-scale cultural penetration into the region based on ethnic and religious community.

The United States strongly encouraged these aspirations of Turkey.

The creation by Turkey in 1992 of the Union of Turkic-speaking States and the provision to the region countries 1.5 billion dollars in the past years for their pragmatic policy also did not bring desired result.

However, despite this, Turkey has managed become an authoritative enough country in the region, which has gained the sympathy of the population.

Currently Turkish business people are seriously competed with China in the commodity market light industry and daily consumption and retain their leading position in this field.

Besides Turkey took precedence over Russia and Iran in the revival of the Great Silk Road, creation of transport and communication and energy corridors West East. The decisive role in this matter played the support of the West and the United States.

With Turkic solidarity, Turkey linked considerable hopes in the matter of promoting its foreign policy intentions.

For example, in response to the recognition of the independence of the Turkic republics, Turkey hoped to obtain recognition of Northern Cyprus. However, at the Ankara meeting of the heads of state and government of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Turkey (October 1992), the Central Asian republics refused to make any joint statement on this matter. They did not go to sign a joint statement

in support of Azerbaijan against the aggression of Armenia, as well as in connection with the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After 1992, the integration processes in Central Asia, especially the relations of these republics with Turkey and the United States, began to acquire the trend towards development is more on a bilateral rather than a regional basis.

Unlike the countries of the region (Iran, Pakistan, etc.) Turkey in its activities in Central Asia distinguished not only the greatest energy, but also a close linkage with the interests and plans of the United States.

In official circles of the United States, NATO, Western European countries it was stated that Turkey "Is considered as an outpost of the West in Central Asia" against the penetration of "Islamic fundamentalism" and as a "means of promotion needed by the West a model of economic liberalism and political democracy." In this regard, in the United States and in the European Community have begun to review the plans for economic subsidies of Turkey in the direction of their increase.

At the same time, the unprecedented deterioration in Turkish-American relations, which began in 1998-1999, began to reduce the role of Turkey as a "bridge". In the American press was noted that the initial plans of the United States of America to establish contacts through the Turkey with the Central Asian republics on various issues "are shifting towards direct bilateral relations with them." American "indifference" to the Turkish plans in Central Asia has further strengthened the deterioration of Turkish-American relations.

In the late 90's. the last century, traditional Turkish isolationism underwent a radical revision.

When planning Turkey's security policy in the early part of the 21st century, inevitably had to take into account the intensity in relations between the successor states of the USSR in the region.

Although Ankara's initial approach to the situation in Eurasia was not entirely realistic, it set the tone for her policies for the

90s. XX century and the beginning of the XXI century. Turkey, may be, and did not become a model for the new states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, but a thriving private sector, secular approach of this country to religious problems and its current democracy remain attractive for the republics of the region.

Not surprisingly, that on the general background deterioration of Turkish-American relations in 2005-2006 this alliance began to intensify in oil and gas deposits of Turkmenia.

In November 2005, as part of the increase efficiency of development of oil and gas fields, state concern "Turkmenneft" and Turkish "Chalyk Energi" signed a contract worth 240 million dollars on the performance of service for drilling wells. The main subcontractor of the project was the company "Parker Drilling International Inc. (USA). In accordance with the planned program implemented jointly with the brigades of the "Burneftegaz" trust of the state concern "Turkmenneft", the Turkish-American alliance commissioned 7 gas wells in Akpatlavuk. In 2006, "Chalyk Energi" and "Parker Drilling International Inc." expanded the geography of the partnership by connecting to the development of natural resources of new promising structures in the south of Turkmenistan.

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Therefore, the emergence of new independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia was a turning point in determining the place of Turkey in the region and its relations with the United States of America. Ankara has become one of the important players in the region, which previously had little influence and

did not play an active role. Naturally, Turkey will continue its efforts to form new networks of interdependence linking Ankara with the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Thus, the analysis shows that the Central Asian policy on the part of Turkey will exert an ever-increasing influence on the US strategy in Central Asia. In this regard, it seems that how deeply and adequately the United States assess presence of Turkey in the above-mentioned region how flexible and in what direction to implement your line here, in many respects will depend not only on the geopolitical appearance of the region, but also the nature of the processes on the wider Eurasian space, and also the actual role of the United States in the emerging new world order.

In world history there was no such favorable international situation for the United States of America, which was formed after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, which united the United States and other states of the world in the fight against the forces of terrorism and extremism.

Being the leading political, economic and military power of the world, the US is trying to maintain and consolidate its global leadership in the long term, realizing along with it the growing importance of the problems of Central Asian security for the whole context of international stability.

Analysis of the above-mentioned realities and trends in world development with a key role in them The United States, the Turkish-American cooperation that is gaining momentum in these years it is especially important to study the US strategy as applied to other external factors of the geopolitical situation in Central Asia.

At the same time, it seems, should take into account the strategic impact on the dynamics of the development of the region, can and do Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Turkey, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the situation in Afghanistan.

Consideration of the geopolitical situation in Central Asia, mutual influence and interaction of Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan,

Turkey with each other and the United States of America, including taking into account the events of September 11, 2001 and the processes in Afghanistan, show that the relations of the states listed in the region continue to be complex in nature.

Firstly, on the one hand, there is a certain rapprochement of the positions of Russia, China and Iran, generally acquiring anti-American, anti-Turkish character. In this regard, some analysts make predictions about the formation of the so-called "strategic Russian-Chinese-Iranian axis" in Eurasia, aimed at countering attempts by the US and its allies to "monopolize" access to the political and economic potential of the Central Asian regions lying between these countries.

On the other hand, Russia, China and Iran are interested in strengthening relations with the United States, as well as in developing comprehensive ties with Turkey and Pakistan. Most vividly, this positive geopolitical context of interaction took place during the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, where the United States became the core factor of international solidarity in the fight against terrorism.

After the events of September 11, 2001, we can talk about a steady trend of growth of strategic interest in Central Asia. And exactly the USA could become the head of this trend, which predetermined success the first stage of the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan - the elimination of the main bases of Islamic terrorists, the Taliban and the establishment of a transitional government on the basis of the Bonn Agreements.

The further character of relations will be determined by the factor of development of regions adjacent to Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan, first of all, Central Asia as a unique geopolitical space where they intersect interests of the states and the leading world power - the USA.

Secondly, the policy of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey is important, although not so significant, as, for example, the strategy of the USA, Russia and China, the factor of the modern geopolitical situation in Central Asia.

Strengthening the positive role of Iran in Central Asia is inextricably linked with the dynamics internal political transformations in a given country, overcoming its international isolation, readiness to conduct constructive dialogue on a wide range of issues - regional conflicts, transport projects, fight against extremism and others.

In turn, for Pakistan, it is especially important to continue active participation in the dialogue on the Afghan problem with a view to long-term stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan. Speaking about Turkey, it should be noted that the level of its influence in the region will largely depend on Ankara's desire to really help strengthen the political and economic systems of Central Asian countries, their international image.

This will contribute to overcoming possible crises both in European-Turkish, and in Turkish-American relations, confirmation of Turkey's international status at the crossroads of Europe and Asia.

Thirdly, a key task for the United States, Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey (as well as the Central Asian states) must be the development of a joint strategy in Afghanistan on a long-term settlement here there is a conflict of external interests.

At the same time, it must be understood that this tactical context of contradictions over Afghanistan will remain a significant barrier to long-term stabilization, not only in Central Asia (or in its parts as Tajikistan), but throughout the Eurasian space.

The recognition of this fact by the above-mentioned world and regional powers, their real support for the initiatives of the Central Asian states to achieve a stable consensus around the Afghan issue, can become a decisive factor in developing a set of measures to create a new order of relations in Central Asia, turning it into a key element in the development of the whole of Eurasia.

Analysis shows that the policy towards Central Asia from Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, as well as the dynamics

of the situation in Afghanistan, will have an ever-increasing impact on the US strategy in the Central Asian region.

The nature of these processes around the Caspian and Central Asia after the events of September 11, 2001, indicate that the United States has already made and still can make significant adjustments in the alignment of forces and interests in the geopolitical situation in the region, firstly, in the direction of its further stabilization and mitigating contradictions along the lines of possible confrontation.

The example of the historically positive Eurasian strategy of the United States of America, which marked the "golden era" of American policy in Europe - the "Marshall Plan" gives grounds to believe in the possibility of using the USA

similar positive elements of their global behavior, but already in the central regions of Eurasia.

At the same time, the Central Asian and Caspian regions with Turkey's important role in them due to their geopolitical significance and emerging trends of a continental nature could become the locomotive of political and the economic zone of stability throughout Eurasia, and Eurasia as a partner of the United States, rather than a source of global contradictions.

At the same time, it seems that now the foreign policy activity of Ankara is becoming an increasingly less significant factor for Central Asia. Demonstrated in due time Turkey's inability to provide sufficient financial, economic and political support to states of region has significantly limited its presence in Central Asia.

However, in general, Turkish and American policy in Central Asia plays a rather progressive role in maintaining the geopolitical balance, integrating the region into the international community. Separate approaches in Washington's policy, in particular forcing already going in most countries of the region of the processes of liberalization, cause some skepticism.

It seems that the idealistic desire to "build Western-style democracies in a short space of time" that some members of the

politically-forming circles of the United States have, do not take into account the existence of a number of threats to security challenges in the region, destructive for stability in Central Asia and throughout the Eurasian space.

In this regard, the US needs to follow the planned course for the region, more to take into account the specifics of the situation here, which can significantly strengthen the authority of Washington and Ankara in Central Asia.

Moreover, the implementation of the project of the Transcaucasia transport corridor, primarily its oil and gas element, and the transformation of Turkey into a crossroads of Asia, Europe and the Middle East, still supports Ankara's hope of increasing its economic and political influence in the region, which means that values for the West. These efforts could become another "golden age" in US world politics.

In general, US behavior in Central Asia and the Caucasus is dictated by a common strategy aimed at strengthening the dominant influence in the globe of the only superpower. It is the strategy that determines the specific tasks in this or that "strategic zone".

CHAPTER II: TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Turkey and the USA are not only allies within NATO, but also strategic partners in many regions of the world. The core interests of the two states are the same. However, there are contradictions between the two sides, for example of which is the Middle East region. This region and the problems about this region remain one of the central themes of Turkey-US relations at the present stage.

One way the urgency of this problem, affect the choice of priority decisions in the political dialogue between Turkey and the United States.

Actuality of this problem is based on Ankara's position attitude to the terrorist "Workers' Party of Kurdistan" (PKK) and its activities, in Turkey and in the Middle East.

At the 90-s of the XX century, Ankara expressed concerns about the threat of Kurdish separatism. With the beginning of the crisis in Persian Gulf, Turkey for a long time resisted attempts by the USA to direct involvement in operation «Desert Storm». Nevertheless, under the pressure of Washington shortly before the outbreak of the war, Ankara sent an additional contingent of troops of more than 40,000 troops to the border with Iraq. Turkey has allowed the United States to significantly increase the number of its combat aircraft at the base of the Air Force in Incirlik, in addition, the Ankara government got permission parliament's to send of Turkish troops abroad. The government did not forget to take advantage of the repeated invasion of Iraq of parts of the Turkish army, during the war and after its end.

Turkey also blocked both branches of the pipeline with Iraq and virtually ceased all economic ties with it. According to Western and Turkish experts, the total amount of losses from the «Desert Storm» amounted about 7 billion dollars for Turkey. To compensate for these losses, Turkey was able to get from the allies of the anti-Iraq coalition only about billion dollars instead of the promised 4.5 billion. Especially with great difficulties,

collided in connection with the mass transition of more than 500 thousand Kurdish refugees from Iraq to Turkey and periodic border crossings in the opposite direction of the Kurdish fighting detachments.

Some analysts believe that in the course of the military operation, "Desert Storm" Ankara's position has played an important role in the refusal of the US administration from bringing it to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. This could lead then to the disintegration of Iraq and the formation of Kurdish state education in the north of the country. However, after the end of «Desert Storm», the Turkish authorities could not prevent the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish region in the north of Iraq in the restricted area for flights of Iraqi aviation. Concerning, after "Desert Storm" Turkish authorities begun closely coordinate with Baghdad policy in joint action against Kurdish terrorists.

With the start of the new anti-Iraq campaign and with the administration of B. Clinton the military operation «Desert Fox», Turkish Prime Minister B. Edzhevit urged not hurry up to use force against Baghdad, referring to the mutual interest in preserving the territorial integrity of Turkey and Iraq.

When, after the events of September 11, 2001, the question arose about the possible spread of the hostilities of Afghanistan to Iraq, B. Ecevit warned that Turkey is against the invasion of Iraq. Then regarded such war as "an aggression capable of bringing the balance in the region to total chaos."

With the coming to power of the pro-islamic "Justice and Development Party" (AKP) led by R.T. Erdogan, the Turkish government began to conduct a policy of maneuvering between the USA and Muslim countries. In conditions of exacerbation of the Iraqi-American crisis, most of them opposed the use of bypassing in adopted of the earlier UN resolutions on Iraq. In a delicate, dual position in the solution the Iraqi crisis and the closely related Kurdish problem, was not only Ankara, but also Washington.

Washington persistently sought from Turkey the provision of its territory for use by the US forces of the invasion of Iraq, besides without the direct participation of Ankara in this war. Turkey for the placement on its territory of the 62,000-strong US contingent was promised a solid financial compensation. It included \$ 6 billion of indirect aid and about \$ 26 billion in a targeted loan to recover the possible losses of the Turkish economy from the war in Iraq.

But the real purpose of such a generous reward was in the other, the United States of America sought to repay Turkey's debts for refusing to directly engage its troops in the invasion to the northern Iraq with a predominantly Kurdish population. The Turkish authorities never concealed their claims to regain control over the oil-rich area of Kirkuk, and was once part of the Turkish wilayet of Mosul. Washington, in order to establish control over these important centers of the oil regions of northern Iraq, without having obtained permission from Ankara to use Turkish territory, was forced to immediately move its troops from Kuwait. The Americans managed to still keep Turkey from entering a large contingent of its troops in Northern Iraq in order to force out the first Kurdish armed formations from «Peshmerga» from Kirkuk and Mosul. Against direct involvement of Turkey in Iraq war and the possible occupation by its troops of Northern Iraq, the majority of the European NATO countries also resolutely acted.

The peculiarity of the new crisis around Iraq was that it developed in the context of the beginning struggle against international terrorism and the more than half a century of the Middle East conflict. This could not give him new geopolitical dimensions. If you look closely, in historical retrospect, it has become the most serious test of Turkish-American relations. At the same time, the crisis brought a new round of direct confrontation with the Arab countries, Israel, with the Palestinian issue aggravated for it, and made Turkey, the only Muslim state

member of NATO with an acute Kurdish problem, an indirect complicit in the Middle East conflict.

In pulling Turkey and the North Atlantic Alliance in the course of the Iraq crisis, the Middle East conflict was viewed, on the one hand, by the alarming tendencies of the development of local hotbeds of tension into a conflict knot of a regional scale, and on the other, there were signs of a split of the North Atlantic bloc because of a different approach to the solution only the Iraqi crisis, but also the closely related Kurdish problem. The disagreements that have emerged on this ground have led, according to Western political scientists, to "the most serious crisis of NATO since the end of the Cold War."

This crisis was settled only through the military committee of NATO, bypassing France. At the final stage of the hostilities, not only Turkey and Iraq, but the Kurds on their borders, turn out to be on different sides of the front. In a situation where Iraqi Kurds acted as US allies in the anti-Iraq war, Kurds on the other side of the Iraqi-Turkish border organized mass anti-war demonstrations. The movement of Kurdish separatists, went into decline in Turkey after the arrest of their leader Abdullah Ocalan, noticeably intensified. In the eventual disintegration of Iraq, Ankara saw a considerable threat to the security and integrity of Turkey. During the years of the Cold War, the maximalist goal of creating a single Kurdish state was not actually put in the real plane. The center of gravity of the struggle for achieving Kurdish statehood or autonomy periodically moved from Iraq (1943-1945) to Iran (1945-1946), then again (in the 60-70s of the XX century) - from Iran to the north of Iraq .

In the 80-90-s of last century the Kurdish movement reached its greatest scope as organized armed protests and terror in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey. Most often, internal inter-Kurdish clashes and conflicts reflected inter-tribal and inter-party contradictions and rivalry between Kurdish supporters and opponents of A.Ojalan, and in the north of Iraq - between supporters of the DPK (Democracy Party of Kurdistan) M.

Barzani and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) J. Talabani. This did not prevent, however, the Iraqi Kurds at times from joining forces not so much in countering the Turkish army as in pursuing and destroying the supporters of A.Ojlan, who penetrated into the northern regions of Iraq.

With the end of the bloc confrontation and the intensification of the processes of globalization, the Kurdish movement in Turkey, in the person of its most radical organization, the PKK, after A.Ojlan's arrest, issued a statement refusing to fight the condemnation of the methods of terrorism used. This was reflected in the defensive speech of A.Ojlan before the European Court.

The Kurdish movement has undergone a completely different evolution in the neighboring Iraq. For a long time Kurdish leaders M. Tarzani and Barzani were feuded. Shortly before the outbreak of the Iraqi war, they declared not only about building cooperation between the DPK and the PUK organizations within the framework of the general anti-Saddam front, but also abandoning the separatist goals of secession from Iraq, which they had previously proclaimed, confirming the agreement to remain on its rights as an equal member Federal state.

Perhaps all these statements were tactical in character - they were dictated primarily by the fears of a large-scale armed invasion of Turkey into the northern Iraq.

Nevertheless, the events of 2003 crossed out the compromise between Turkey and the United States of America, and have divided the NATO allies in different corners. At first, Turkey strongly opposed the US use of military force against Iraq. After George Bush in July 2002 announced his intention to overthrow Iraqi power at any cost, the Turkish government expressed a strong objection to the military solution of the Iraqi issue, stressing the need for military force against a "sovereign and independent country only after gaining authority from the side of the UN Security Council".

Secondly, Turkey refused the US demand to deploy troops in the 62,000 soldiers of the northern front for strikes against Iraq. After a while, the government led by Abdullah Gul under great pressure from Washington was forced to accept this demand, but the government draft rejected the parliament (GNAT) of the country. Thus, this carefully prepared Pentagon plan of the northern direction in the war failed. After that, the Bush administration accused Turkey of inadequate activity in consultations with deputies of the ruling party. However, Turkish politicians shifted responsibility to the US, accusing the American media of blackening the country, which greatly angered the national feeling of the people: exactly this, in the opinion of Turkish deputies, led to a vote of wavering members of parliament against.

Thirdly, Washington became friends with the Iraqi Kurds, which certainly worried Turkey. On 8 March 2004, the Interim Governing Council of Iraq approved a transitional constitution defining the principles of the country's governance until the end of 2005. It is noteworthy that it stipulated the clause according to which the Kurds controlling the northern part of Iraq have the right to block the adoption of the 2005 constitution.

Ankara immediately responded to the signing of this transitional constitution and accused the United States of artificially tightening out the process of establishing peace and stability in Iraq. Turkish politicians pointed out that the constitution was signed under the pressure of the United States, which could "convince the Shiite leader Ayatollah A. Sistani of the need to adopt this law." According to the Turkish side, without Washington's intervention, 13 Shiite deputies of the Iraqi Interim Council would certainly not sign a document that "opened the door to Kurdish separatism." But US President George Bush noted that, despite Turkey's criticism, Iraq's transitional constitution is "a significant step on the path of the Iraqi people from dictatorship to democracy." Thus, Washington proved in practice that, in its relations with Ankara, it will not

listen to its wishes and will not change its Middle East policy because of its fears. The transitional constitution of Iraq has become a kind of response of the United States of America to Ankara for its unwillingness at the time to open the northern front in the war against the regime of Saddam Hussein. In 2003, Washington was extremely concerned about the reluctance of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to provide the country's territory for the passage of US troops, as the calculations for Turkey as its faithful ally failed, the United States was forced to postpone the start of the military operation and reconsider the way of transferring troops to Iraq.

Sabah commentator Mehmet Tezkan wrote: "... that the authorities are again in the minefield, this time rejecting the American proposal to send Turkish troops is unlikely to succeed, and the government and the Mejlis understand that not supporting the US request means freezing the Turkish -American relations, cause a conflict with the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and lose the promised multi-billion dollar loans. "

After persistent pressure on the TGNA, the government of R.T. Erdogan has achieved that the deputies made concessions and decided to grant the United States of America airspace to Turkey. Nevertheless, Washington was dissatisfied with the decision of Ankara, as it expected to deploy its troops on the Turkish-Iraqi border. In early May 2003, First Deputy Secretary of Defense P. Wolfowitz openly accused Turkey of inaction on the deployment of US troops and noted Washington's dissatisfaction with partial support of his plans by Ankara. P. Wolfowitz stressed that the opening of the second front in the northern part of Iraq to a large extent "could facilitate the US military task, reduce human losses and save the budget." But despite the statements of US politicians and the US sanctions against Turkey for its indecision, Ankara officially replied that it was not mistaken in its strategy choice and made the only correct decision.

The Turkish government, although granting the Americans the right to restrict the use of Turkish bases, showed maximum caution in order to prevent an uncontrolled course of events in the event of a protracted war in Iraq. Notwithstanding certain outbreaks of separatist Kurdish speeches and the recurrence of their terrorist actions by some Islamist groups (in particular, Ansar al-Islam), the Kurdish movement in Iraq hastened to enlist the support of the countries of the anti-Iraqi coalition, mainly the US and other Western states.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, relations between the US and Turkey resumed for objective reasons. Turkey and the US need to continue bilateral military-political cooperation. The decision to send troops to Iraq on August 10, 2003, is considered the beginning of the turn.

Throughout 2004, the Kurdish issue was the main issue of the Turkish-American dialogue. Ankara demanded that Washington take decisive action against the PKK detachments based in the territory of the Northern Iraq. Turkish Foreign Minister A. Gul, who regularly visits Washington, noted in his statements that there are over 5,000 Turkish Kurds in the territory of the northern Iraq, among them terrorists hiding from the Turkish authorities. Ankara openly declared that Washington's Middle East policy leads to the threat of Kurdish separatism and if it is not revised, the Middle East will face insurmountable difficulties.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeatedly insisted that the US should reconsider its attitude to the Kurdish issue and unite with Turkey in the fight against the PKK. The country's leadership pointed to the incidents of attacks on Turkish soldiers by party militants and on the inactivity of Americans in these matters. Only in 2004, Turkey lost over 80 people in Iraq, including both military personnel and civilians. Ankara said that attacks on the Turkish convoys and police posts are carried out by PKK members, and insisted on a thorough investigation of these attacks. In turn, George W. Bush replied to the leadership of

Turkey that Washington is ready for cooperation, since the US intends to "preserve the integrity and indivisibility of Iraq."

However, the Americans did not conduct any decisive actions against members of the Kurdish party. Since early 2004, Washington has introduced the Kurdistan Workers' Party to the list of terrorist organizations, as was announced by the head of the US administration in Iraq P. Bremer. According to his statement, "party members harbor terrorists among the Kurdish population of Iraq, and terrorism in the renewed Iraq should be eradicated." In its response, Ankara expressed gratitude to the US government "for understanding the whole danger of the situation when the threat of Kurdish separatism is coming to the Middle East".

It should be noted that the fight against the above-mentioned threat in 2004-2005 united Turkey with Syria and Iran. This rapprochement did not suit Washington, which views Syria as its potential enemy. Turkey, in turn, did not react to US comments on this topic, as assurances of the leadership of the United States "on understanding the whole complexity of the situation" have not tuned Ankara for a long time to an optimistic mood. At the time, Turkey was not satisfied with the fact that the Americans regularly met with the leaders of the PKK, on the results of which they did not consider their duty to inform Ankara.

Beginning from 2006, the US and Turkey, realizing the extraordinary importance of bilateral relations not only for the national interests of the two countries, but also for their Middle Eastern significance, began to strengthen regional aspects of bilateral cooperation. In Ankara and Washington, in order to normalize this cooperation, was made a decision to exchange delegations and expert groups on issues of interaction at a regional level on a regular basis. Only for 2005-2006 Turkey was visited by 49 high-ranking American delegations representing the main US government departments: the presidential administration, the State Department, the Pentagon, both chambers of the Congress, all special services, including the CIA

(Central Intelligence Agency) and the FBI (Federal Investigative and Intelligence Agency).

One of the examples of such intense diplomacy was the visit to Ankara in March 2006 of P. Paige, the chief of the Joint Command of the US Armed Forces. Formally, the American general arrived to participate in the international symposium "Global Terrorism and International Cooperation". In fact, the main burden of his visit to Turkey consisted of talks with Prime Minister RT Erdogan (now the President of Turkey), in the course of which were raised about the most painful points of Turkish-American relations, the Kurdish problem, the issue of the deployment of the PKK fighters in the territory of the Northern Iraq, where they conducted military operations in Turkish territory, the situation in Iraq, Iran's nuclear program, relations with Hamas, which won in the Palestinian parliamentary elections. The American general, summing up his stay in Turkey, stated with military directness: "I looked in the eye of Turks and told them the truth." Apparently, this truth was a "stumbling block" in Turkish-American relations. According to the estimates of the Turkish experts, during the talks none of the above mentioned issues reached a mutually acceptable result. So, for the most sensitive Kurdish issue for Turkey, General Page confined himself to verbal condemnation of Kurdish terrorism and recognition of the PKK as a terrorist organization. During previous negotiations at various levels, the United States of America has repeatedly promised to take tough measures to disarm militants, destroy their camps and warehouses, close PKK affiliates and cells in Western Europe, and financial accounts of the organization. One of them was voiced, in particular, in September 2005 during the visit to Ankara of the commander of American troops in Europe, the army general J. Jones. He noted that the PKK is a common problem for Turkey, Iraq and the United States, "first of all Ankara and Baghdad must solve it, and Washington, if necessary and expedient, will help".

The absence of the US intention to practically realize its promises to the Turkish side regarding the PKK was also discussed by the results of the talks between Turkish Foreign Minister A. Gul and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, held in September 2005 in New York as part of the work of the UN General Assembly. As a result of these negotiations, the head of the US diplomacy reassured Ankara in its principled consent to severe security measures against the PKK in the Northern Iraq, but, in her opinion, "such actions could only be taken at a convenient time for Washington." Turkish analysts, summarizing the talks of a high-ranking general in Ankara, expressed the opinion that the Americans are not interested in harsh measures against the PKK, although, like the European Union, they consider this organization to be a terrorist organization. These analysts, not without reason, believed that "keeping the PKK problem in a suspended state allows the US administration to keep Ankara in the wake of its regional and global policy."

As for the Iranian nuclear program, Turkey, at the talks with the chief of the Joint Staff Command of the US Armed Forces, P. Paige, stated that "nuclear Iran is worried about Ankara, but Turkey recognizes the right of everyone to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. When its application goes beyond this framework, it causes concern." In Turkish diplomatic circles in connection with this noted that despite the certain tightening of Ankara's position on the Iranian nuclear program, there is no real criticism of Iran on the issue in the military-political leadership of Turkey. In a sign of approval of this position from the Iranian side, even was made Turkey's proposal to enrich uranium in its territory, which was voiced by the Iranian ambassador in Ankara. Naturally, this proposal was more propagandistic in nature than an open desire for cooperation with Turkey in this field, since there is no corresponding infrastructure, technology and conditions for it on the Turkish territory (and Tehran is well aware of this).

Meanwhile, the main problem of Turkish-American relations remains the Kurdish issue. It is not surprising that in these few years (especially after 2003) in Turkey, the perception of the United States of America - both among the general public and among the ruling - has acquired a negative connotation. Since the end of September 2007, militants from the Kurdistan Workers Party staged several terrorist attacks in Turkish territory, as a result of 30 servicemen and civilians were killed, and in the summer of 2007 from the hands of militants killed 100 people. All this aroused indignation in the Turkish society, as the country's law enforcement bodies could not catch the attacking militants, despite the fact that the antiterrorist operation in the south-east of Turkey was conducted by the security forces even from June 2007.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan first held a meeting with leaders of the ruling Justice and Development Party. After that, the "antiterrorist summit" took place at the residence of President A.Gyul, in which, with R.T. Erdogan, was present the head of the General Staff, General Yashar Beukanut, an influential figure among Turkish political elites who had long promoted the idea of a ground military operation against Iraqi Kurds. Immediately after this meeting, R. Erdogan said that the Turkish government approves the idea of a military strike against the Kurds. The military developed four variants of the operation in the Northern Iraq. The first option was suggested by the army corps to advance to a depth of 5-10 kilometers and take control of the border area. According to the second variant, the special forces of Turkey, with the support of helicopters, had to conduct "point operations" in the north of Iraq. The bases of Kurdish militants were to be destroyed, and the captives were delivered to Turkish territory. The third scenario envisaged a massive bombardment of the Kandil mountain range, where, according to the intelligence services, the main bases of the PKK fighters were located. The fourth option, which the Turkish media called the most acceptable to the authorities, was to conduct a land-based

operation in the northern Iraq. This plan would allow the troops with minimal losses and in a short time to reach the set goals and return back to Turkey.

Experts noted that there are no more than 4,500 Kurdish militants. However, in spite of their scarcity, they had great experience in conducting military operations in the mountains. In addition, the fighters of two influential groups of Iraqi Kurds - the Democratic Party of M. Barzani and the Patriotic Union of J. Talabani - could fight on the side of the PKK formations. Meanwhile, «The Washington Post» reported that the US had developed a plan for conducting a covert military operation, in which was planned to decapitate the movement of Kurdish separatists. The operation was supposedly conducted jointly with Turkey. As noted by the edition, the Americans developed this plan, expected to discourage Ankara from the invasion of Iraq. However, this information was refuted by the official representative of the US State Department T. Kasey. Another representative of the State Department, Sh. McCormack, publicly warned the Turks against the military operation in Iraq.

Representatives of the White House and the National Security Council of the United States also addressed the demand for resolving the "questions" that arose peacefully, within the framework of diplomatic norms. The State Department reminded Turkey of the agreement reached in late September 2007 with Iraq, according to which Ankara pledged to refrain from military operations on Iraqi territory. Washington was afraid that the Turkish military invasion would lead to destabilization in Iraq. Nevertheless, the Iraqi authorities, condemning Ankara for frequent shelling of its territory, did not take any real steps against the Kurdish militants. The explanation of such an indifferent position, perhaps, should be sought in the fact that Iraqi President J. Talabani by nationality is a Kurd.

Thus, the US was in a rather difficult situation. At first, the White House clearly did not want to quarrel with Turkey - its key ally in the region, by the way, through the territory of which, all

basic cargoes are delivered to Iraq. Secondly, it was unprofitable for the United States of America to spoil relations with the Kurds, the agreement with which allowed the Americans not to spray their troops throughout Iraqi territory, focusing on operations against Shiite and Sunni militants.

It is interesting that the intensification of the terrorist activity of the Kurds coincided with the resumption of discussions about the transformation of Iraq into a federation with broad powers of regional authorities. First, the US Senate approved by a majority vote a resolution (September 26, 2007), according to which Iraq was supposed to divide conditionally into three parts - Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish. Then J. Talabani supported this idea - the president of Iraq, as this plan quite satisfied the Kurds of the country. Categorically opposed this idea were made in Turkey. Ankara expressed fears that an independent Kurdish state is being formed in the north of Iraq, which would lead to an increase in separatism in neighboring Turkish areas, where mainly live Kurds. According to one version, the circumstance that the Iraqi Kurds can finally secede from Baghdad, and forced Turkey to hurry with the military operation and with the final solution of the question of the continued existence of the PKK.

According to some reports, 10,000 Turkish soldiers were mobilized to carry out the "limited operation"; almost 5 thousand of them were involved directly in the first hours of the invasion. The Turks were confronted by about 4,000 armed militants who acted as small mobile groups. Under the onslaught of the Turkish army, the PKK fighters decided to change tactics. They said would transfer the fighting to Turkish territory. One of the leaders of the PKK – B. Erdal, called on the Kurds to raise the uprising in Turkey.

Even at the stage of discussing the possibility of launching military operations on its territory, the government of Iraq made it clear that it regards Turkey's actions "as a violation of its sovereignty." In turn Turkey starting military operations, paid special attention to diplomatic subtleties. Prime Minister R.T.

Erdogan stressed immediately after the invasion that the actions of the Turkish army are directed only against terrorists and that "there is nothing to fear for the Iraqi brothers, civilians and our friends."

Some European analysts are convinced that the attempt to put an end to the Kurdish separatism by military means has no chance of success. In their opinion, it would be much more effective for the integration of Kurds - mountain Turks - into Turkish society, so that Turkey would become their homeland. On the other hand, the European aspiration to harmonize everything and bring the parties to a visible agreement in the case of Turkey may not work. It is not at all obvious that after gaining more freedoms, the Kurds will want to remain in Turkey, and they will not threaten the territorial integrity of the state. Armed struggle they lead throughout over 20 years now. During this time, its victims were 37 thousand people. Today Turkey decided to act by force. This is no less important argument in the fight against terrorism and its consequences.

Summing up the results of the Middle East policy of Turkey and the US, we can state the following: The Iraq war (both the first and the second) has given still greater power to the process of globalization, accompanied by the escalating struggle with the forces of ant globalism. When "reforming" Iraq, the globalists will most likely continue to play on inter-state, and on ethno religious, including intra-Iraqi contradictions. This can happen within the borders of Iraq and Turkey, as well as within the entire ethnographic geography "Kurdistan", now included in the borders of the "Great Near (Middle) East". After the Iraq crisis, it began to be identified by the Americans with the expanded "zone of strategic responsibility" of the US Central Command.

Disintegration processes will simultaneously increase, given the controversial nature of the boundaries established in the past century. The activity of the Kurdish factions, on the one hand, favors the incitement of inter-religious strife in Northern Iraq, whose population is highly polyconfessional, and on the other -

strengthens the centrifugal tendencies, which represent an even greater threat in the conditions of its dismemberment into three zones.

At the beginning of the XX century, was also alarming the principle of "partitioning" Iraq, in which the Kurdish autonomous region bordering with Turkey, could be transferred to the control of a mixed European continent. The question of Kirkuk became the main obstacle in Turkish-Iraqi-Kurdish relations, especially since the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline provides the outlet of Iraqi oil through the Turkish Mediterranean to the world market.

The Kurdish problem acquired much more importance in the ethnography of the Iraq crisis than, for example, when the Taliban regime was overthrown in Afghanistan. Unresolved ethnic problems create great problems in ensuring territorial integrity, whether in Palestine, Israel, Iraq or Turkey.

Struggle there with terrorism or separatism with religious or other coloration is more often than not limited to the borders of one state. It cannot be determined by any time frame, measured in years or even decades. It was in Afghanistan so. The crisis in the Gulf has already dragged on for decades. All countries of the world were involved in it in different degrees. Neither nor the war that resumed 12 years after it in Iraq has brought closer to the solution of those ethnic and national, territorial and border issues which are commonly called the "ethnography of war".

Under the "air umbrella" and political patronage of the United States, the Kurds of the autonomous region of Iraq took the course of Europeanization and cooperation with the political elites of Western Europe and the United States. But this cooperation in no way can be attributed to constructive trends in the Middle East region.

After the war in Iraq and during its "reform", the geopolitical link of Turkey with the Northern Iraq could become a complex puzzle, both for the US and for European Union. The decision largely depended not only on the success of the post-war arrangement of Iraq. There were serious doubts that the Iraqi

Kurds were satisfied with freedom, in the boundaries that they gave; at least, Iraqi Kurds could have achieved the preservation of autonomy in federal Iraq as a possible pattern in the future and a wider federation.

This would inevitably cause further aggravation of Turkey's relations with the US and NATO. Washington in this connection could face a difficult dilemma of how to preserve the allied Kurds in the Iraq crisis without damaging the strategic partnership with Turkey by a single Muslim ally of the United States for NATO in the Middle East.

In 2015, Turkey invaded Iraq territory against ISIS. The result was partial withdrawal and continuation of the operation in Iraq.

As we said Middle East plays important role in external policy of Turkey. Pro-democracy protests and uprisings began in the Middle East and North Africa (Mashrig and Magrib countries) in 2010 and 2011, against authoritarian regimes. Demonstrators expressed political and economic grievances against brutal system and antidemocratic mood in all these countries. All these events faced violent crackdowns by Arab countries' security forces. On the wave of Arab spring (so was called revolution in all Arab countries) began Jasmine Revolution (Tunisia), Egypt Uprising of 2011, Yemen Uprising of 2011–12, Libya Revolt of 2011, and Syria Uprising of 2011–12. Turkey, claiming to be a Middle Eastern leader, tried to take advantage of the turmoil in the Arab world to strengthen its influence in the region, spreading democratization and liberalization among Islamic states.

The events in Egypt and Tunisia did not threaten the interests of Turkey in the region. However, Libya was more important for Turkey (economic) significance. Therefore, Turkey tried to maneuver in the events taking place in Libya.

The turning point for Turkey was the events in Syria in the wake of the Arab spring. Despite very close relations with Syria before the events of the Arabs spring, in the following years,

Turkey became one of the representatives of the anti-Assad regime, disagreements began in relations between two countries.

For this reason, Turkey launched «Euphrates shield» military operation in Syria, 2015-2016 against ISIS and Syrian Kurdish groups. This operation ended with Turkish victory, ISIS was driven out from the northern part of Syria.

Another conflict turkish-kurdish conflict («Olive Branch», 2018, January 20, March, 24) again ended with victory of Turkey and capture of Afrin and surrounding area by Turkish military troops.

Operation Source of Peace is a military operation of the Turkish armed forces and pro-Turkish armed groups of the Syrian opposition that invaded the north of the Syrian Arab Republic against the background of the ongoing civil war in the country. The official announcement of the start of the operation was made by the President of Turkey on October 9, 2019.

In general, the large and exceptional military presence of the United States in the Persian Gulf, as well as the almost monopolistic possession of a powerful combat potential for conducting military operations far from the national territory, opens the broadest possibilities for the US to make the necessary political decisions.

The official doctrinal documents in outline defining, the military-political strategy of Obama administration which published on February, April, May 2010 and February 2011: the «Quadrennial Defense Review», «Nuclear Posture Review», «National Security Strategy» and the «National Military Strategy of the United States of America» - from the beginning to the end are imbued with the idea of undivided leadership of the United States in world affairs, based on the American military power and power politics. In this respect, what today became known as the "Obama doctrine" does not differ much from the "Bush doctrine" that preceded it, as well as the imperialist doctrines of "peace in American way" - Pax Americana - that appeared in the US at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.

The USA military spending, is constantly growing and today, especially after 2001, by the draft budget for starting on October 1, 2011 fiscal year, which represented by Obama in January 2010 in the US Congress, almost 50% of the world's spending on these purposes, namely 711 billion, if you add here the military expenditures of the US allies, the total amount will reach \$ 1150 billion, or 81% of the world's expenditures.

The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 at the World Trade Center in New York mean the coming of a new era. The West with attempts to forcibly instill their values around the world causes a reaction of rejection. In conflict situations in which the banner is used by religions (the events of September 11, 2001, the Indo-Pakistani conflict, religious clashes in Nigeria, the Israeli-Palestinian war), the interfaith meeting in Assisi (January 24, 2002) sets itself the task of refuting the thesis about the conflict of civilizations and return to religious wars. Thus, the events of September 11, 2001 served as a catalyst for accelerating the already existing trends that reflect the new world.

CHAPTER III: EUROPEAN POLICY OF TURKEY

Turkey is an integral part of Eurasia, which determines its special place in the international political system. Today, when the geopolitical theorem of Turkish politics on a global scale is solved through the balance and opposition of the two orientations - Atlantic and Eurasian, Europe plays an important role not only in Turkish foreign policy, but also in a certain sense directly relates to Turkish-American cooperation.

Europe today occupies an intermediate position between the Asian mainland and the transatlantic US. The ethno-confessional composition of Europe itself has also changed. Those who believe that joining to Europe is the answer to all questions are cruelly mistaken. Europe cannot and does not want to be more than a totality of countries, but has not "awakened as a new democratic empire". As for Turkey, regardless of whether Turkey joins the European Union or not, it must build a system of balanced positive relations with Brussels, based on the rejection of the implementation of anti-European functions, which are the basis of the Atlantic strategy.

On the other hand, the end of the Cold War, the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and the entire socialist camp, the deepening political, economic and military integration of Western Europe created the conditions under which the European Community had the opportunity to claim the role of a new military, political center of power. In this regard, the accession to this organization acquires a special attraction for the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe. In the first place are not so much economic benefits (although they play a very large role), but rather an introduction to a kind of "elected club", which provides the member state authority on the international scene.

It is not surprising that Turkey seeks to EU. Relations with the European Union in the early 60's. of the XX century was characterized by Turkey becoming an associate member of European Economic Community, which implied in the future its

acceptance as full members of this organization. The military coup of 1980 slowed the development of bilateral relations, the normalization of which began only with the restoration of civil society institutions in Turkey.

In 1987, Turkey filed an official request for full membership in the EU, but Western European countries preferred to develop bilateral relations with it through the creation of a customs union. This union of Turkey and the EU began functioning on January 1996, however, many Turkish businessmen and scientists regarded it as positive only for Western Europe. On December 1997 Luxembourg Summit of the Council of Europe, where the enlargement of the European Union (EU) was considered, Turkey was not included among the candidate countries for accession, unlike the 9 states of Eastern Europe and Cyprus. The status of the candidate was received by Turkey in 1999 in Helsinki Summit. So, after numerous delays, on December 1999, at a meeting of the European Council, was decided the question of granting Turkey the status of a candidate and the decision was positive.

The monetary and financial crisis that struck the country in 2000 led to the fact that on December 11 in 2000 conference in Nice, the EU member states actually pushed Turkey to the last place in the list of candidates for joining to this organization.

At the summit in Laeken on December 2001, the EU defined Turkey as "a country whose prospects for joining the union are very large." At EU summit on December 12-13 in 2002 in Copenhagen it was said that Turkey can count on full membership in EU not earlier than 2005.

The crisis of the European Union started in 2004-2005 connected with the negative relations of a significant part of its inhabitants to a pan-European constitution, made it difficult for new members to join the EU. The question of Turkey's membership in the EU is still open; so let us dwell on the reasons for the delay in this process.

At first, it is necessary to find out the reason for the obvious reluctance of Europeans to accept Turkey, and what motivates Turkey to aspire to get into the European Union, despite all the obstacles. Then, understand what benefits the EU can get from Turkey's accession, and only then determine the significance of this problem for Turkish-American relations.

A clear position on Turkey's accession to EU in European cooperation is not observed. There is quite a strong opposition movement, which includes almost all right-wing parties, European conservatives, such famous figures as Silvio Berlusconi, Jacques Chirac, Jose Maria Ansar, Giscard d'Estaing, are categorically against the nomination of Turkey. Austria, Hungary, Holland, Denmark and France are the most active opponents of Turkey's admission to EU. On the side of the Turks are the English and the Italians. Partly "for" the Spaniards and the Germans. Germany believes that cooperation with Turkey (which Germany views primarily as a partner and ally of NATO) should be "strategic and long-term".

For new EU members, the issue of Turkey's accession to the EU does not play a big role, as they are more concerned with strengthening their own positions. Nevertheless, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are positive about the possible accession of Turkey, believing that this will help maintain global stability. A special position in Greece, which Turkey's accession to the EU affects directly. Greek President K. Stephanopoulos said that Turkey can not enter the European Union if it does not settle all existing conflicts with Greece. The Greeks attach great importance to the question of the belonging of the islands and part of the coastal shelf of the Aegean Sea (where, according to the assumptions, oil and gas deposits are located).

Greece considers the presence of its islands directly off the Turkish coast as its right to these waters; Turkey, in turn, insists on the internal character of the Aegean Sea and the conduct of negotiations, pushing for the delimitation of the shelf into two equal halves (Turkish and Greek, respectively). As for the

assumption of the location of oil and gas on this shelf, Greek and Turkish sources estimate the Aegean Sea oil reserves at 200 million tons, natural gas - about 30 billion cubic meters. Apparently, Greece is ready to use the issue of Turkey's accession to the EU to resolve disputes in its favor. The Cyprus issue plays an important role in the relations between Turkey and Greece. In 2003, Turkey demanded that the Greek part of Cyprus be accepted into the EU not earlier than the legitimacy of the government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be officially recognized (so far only Turkey has recognized it). Because of the referendum, (70% of the Greek Cypriots refused to unite with the northern part of Cyprus, while the population of Northern Cyprus voted to unite and join the unified Cyprus state to the European Union) held on April in 2004, only the southern part of Cyprus was admitted to the European Union (although this contradicts the agreements of the 1959-1960s: the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959; Agreement of 1960).

In order not to aggravate relations with Greece, Turkey made concessions (the Turkish government feared that when voting on Turkey's accession to EU, Greece uses its veto right), and agreed to expand the border of the Customs Union of Turkey and EU with Cyprus.

The political elite of Turkey and Europeans and Americans are united in their opinion that Muslim states should develop in the direction of secular democracy. Many Turks negatively perceived the policy of the Bush administration, which viewed Turkey as a "model" for spreading democracy in the Middle East. Representatives of the ruling class of Turkey prefer a softer European approach for spreading democracy to the neoconservative method of imposing it.

The events of September 11, 2001 had contradictory consequences for the solution of the problem of Turkey's membership in the EU. On the one hand, this provided new arguments who considered Turkey's accession to the EU the best way to strengthen democracy in an Islamic state. In the fight

against a radical minority, it is vital to rely on a stable secular Muslim democracy. On the other hand, terrorism gave food to the fears of those who believed that Muslims were a source of potential danger and therefore opposed further Muslim immigration and admission to the EU of a country that until the middle of the 21st century will remain the EU's leader in population. These fears openly expressed in the referendums on the draft European constitution in France and Netherlands in 2005, and even intensified during the debate. Anti-Turkish sentiment and condemnation of the EU's further expansion, backed by riots of Arab youth in French suburbs and the murder of Theo Van Gogh in Netherlands (The Dutch filmmaker, television producer, publicist and actor, was killed in 2004, for the film "Submission") played a decisive role in the negative outcome of the vote. Since then, all polls only confirm that the majority of the population in most of the EU countries oppose Turkey's membership in the EU.

At the heart of the current difficulties arising in the way of Turkey in the "Common Market" are also economic and social factors, the scientific, technical and technological base of production in Turkey that does not quite meet modern requirements. Although despite the monetary and financial crisis at the turn of 2000-2001, today Turkey's economy is in relatively good condition.

In general, the five factors should ensure a favorable future for the Turkish economy:

- the lowest average age of the population in Europe;
- continuous increase in the level of education;
- low labor costs (lower than in many European countries)
- possibility to export goods to the EU countries without paying customs duties due to the agreement on the customs union;
- a strategic position at the junction of the Asian, European and Middle Eastern markets.

A special place in the Turkish economy is the export of manufactured goods. Turkey's exports to the UK are growing rapidly.

Now the government is carrying out a number of reforms in Turkish economy (banking reform and mid-term reform of tax policy). Among the positive aspects that have recently emerged can be attributed a significant increase in imports, the main part of which is raw materials and semi-finished products. The growth of imports in Turkey, as a rule, is closely connected with GDP (Gross domestic product) growth.

EU clearly does not dare into their ranks a country with a high unemployment rate, a huge budget deficit, a disproportion of territorial socio-economic development, characterized by the fact that 90% of industrial production is concentrated in Istanbul, Izmir and Bursa. EU requirements include the implementation of the IMF and WB approved program of structural reforms, combating inflation, transparency of the state's tax policy, reforming the agricultural sector, monitoring state subsidies.

Perhaps, it was the status of the "eternal candidate" for EU accession helped Turkey achieve a very high level of economic development compared to other Islamic countries. Turkey seeking to implement all recommendations of the Commission, is constantly improving its economy, modernizing it, seeking new progress in this or that sphere.

However, Turkey's prospects for joining the EU further deteriorated in 2005, when the Greater Coalition replaced the Red-Green government, although the CDU / CSU government always condemned Turkey's accession to the EU and instead offered it a "privileged partnership". France changed its constitution in such a way as to oblige the government to hold a referendum if Turkey's accession to the EU becomes real. In the same way, Austria also pledged to hold a referendum, which on this issue follows the same line of conduct as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian-Social Union (CSU) and the majority of whose population is against Turkey's accession to the EU. Further reduction of Turkey's chances of EU membership brought the entry into the European Union of Cyprus. The EU, which enjoyed the stable support of the United

States, proceeded from the assumption that Cyprus's membership in the EU would help remove the contradictions between the Greek south of the island and its Turkish north. This was to lead to the opening of the ports of the Turkish North for trade with Greek Cyprus based on a plan developed at the initiative of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

On the eve of the Council of Europe meeting on December 15, 2006, opening one seaport of the Turkish north of Cyprus for trade with Greek and one airport defused the situation, but all attempts to find a compromise are not have been successful, so the Council of Europe has concluded negotiations on only eight sections of thirty-five.

After decades of confrontation in the Cold War, relations between Moscow and Ankara have improved in recent years to such a degree that a new geostrategic situation has developed in the region. The manifestation of this was a significant increase in Turkish investments in the Russian economy, laying the gas pipeline across the Black Sea. In addition, both states supported each other in the fight against the Chechen and Kurdish separatists. The identical positions of Turkey and Russia in Abkhazia, their joint opposition to Georgia's accession to NATO and US policy in Iraq are the manifestations of what the US believes can lead to the rapprochement of the two states. In this regard, Turkey is no longer a self-evident ally for the US - neither in the struggle for energy sources in Central Asia, nor in pursuing US policy in Russia and the Middle East. On the other hand, the Turkish elite advocating for modernization cannot also proceed from the fact that its desire for EU membership will be crowned with success and that the restoration of previous ties with the United States can become an alternative solution for the country in case of failure. Regardless of this state of affairs, both the USA and the EU are equally interested in modern, secular and democratic Turkey as a strategically important partner in stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, ensuring their supply

of energy from Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey will be able to play the best role as an EU member.

So why does not Turkey like Europeans? When discussing Turkey's accession to the EU, was often raised the issue of non-compliance with its Copenhagen criteria. The country should have political stability, democracy, a competitive market and respect for human rights. In the 80-90, the last century the country did not meet many of these indicators. But since 1999, when Turkey became an official candidate, significant changes were made, including the adoption in October 2001 of amendments to the Constitution (most important of which is the right to broadcast in the languages of national minorities and the imposition of the death penalty only in wartime and for acts terrorism). However, the claims to the Criminal Code remained. Representatives of various European human rights organizations continued to find new examples of human rights violations in Turkey. The Kurdish question remains unresolved.

Turkey was accused for the active role of the military in the political life of the country. On the other hand, a pro-Western political course has always been held in Turkey with the support of the military, which, as opposed to traditionalists based on religion and orientated toward the East, has until now been the basis of secular power in Turkey. Religion still occupies an important place in the domestic political life of the country. The flow of traditionalists is quite strong in Turkey. The party of moderate Islamists is in power - the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which stands for religious freedom and freedom of conscience at the modern stage.

The negative attitude towards Turkey's accession to the EU from a significant part of the European population is largely determined by the stereotype that has developed in Europe regarding the Turks. In 1985, in Europe, within the framework of the «National meeting» (Milli Gerush) current was created a radical organization by J. Kaplan, "Union of Islamic Societies and Communities," which aimed to overthrow the secular

government in Turkey. The followers of Kaplan formed party under the name the "State of the Caliphate", based in Cologne, which aimed to create an Islamic state in Turkey. The party divided the territory of Germany into districts, which should have been led by the emirs. In late 2001, the German authorities managed to ban the "State of the Caliphate" organization. Along with Germany and Turkey, "The State of the Caliphate" also operates in Holland, Belgium, France, Austria, Sweden, Denmark.

Part of population in Turkey advocates the membership of Turkey in the EU. What is the reason for such unanimity? The main reason Erdogan calls hope for the stabilization of democratic foundations, bringing the standard of living in the country to the European level. Not in last place the economic benefits, the support of one of the world's largest economies will be the basis for the country's economic growth. Turkey is part of the EEC, but unlike European, Turkish producers have to overcome the difficulties caused by high bank interest and inflation. Membership in the EU would help Turkey to attract foreign investment, and get cheaper loans, which is very important for it. The gap between different sections of the population is very large, and accession to the EU could help redistribute income. Because of Turkey has been denied permanent membership for a long period, using various tricks. For Turkey, joining the EU has become a matter of principle. Turks are wondering what they are worse than Europeans, and once again trying to prove their European character.

How unprofitable is the European Union to accept Turkey? At first glance, it is really may threaten the inflow of Turkish labor. But immigration to the EU countries and at the moment is not a big difficulty for the Turks, who since the 60s. the last century flooded to the west for study, temporary work or permanent residence.

For example, the impetus for immigration to Germany was sharply increased in the late of 50's the need of the German

economy in the labor force. The mass influx began in the early of 60's XX century, when West Germany signed the relevant agreements with Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968).

Currently, the largest community in Germany is Turkish (2.2 - 2.4 million people). Islamization of France was promoted by its liberal legislation, according to which children of immigrants born in France could claim citizenship. At present, the number of Muslims in France is estimated at 3.5 to 5 million people. Therefore, can hardly expect worsening of the situation. Rather, if Turkey becomes part of Europe, then the appeal of the image of the "West" will no longer be so strong. In addition, the standard of living in Turkey with accession to the EU will increase, then after a certain period of time the flow of immigrants will significantly weaken.

If we talk about the demographic situation, the Turkish population can rejuvenate the "aging Europe". The potential for this benefit is especially important in connection with demographic trends in the EU member states. Foreign investments, which Turkey counts on, also cannot be ranked as negative sides of Turkey's accession to the EU. Rather, they can be beneficial to EU countries.

As for the EU as a "Christian club", the adoption of Turkey will destroy this image, especially, that the real state of affairs and the demographic situation indicate that the population of the European Union can no longer be called homogeneously Christian.

Sharp sayings representatives of Christian-democratic and Christian-social unions of Europe regarding Turkey's accession to the EU expose the whole of Europe in an unfavorable light before the world community.

Another important detail: through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Europe receives oil from Russia and the Caspian region. Turkish tankers now transport about 1/3 of the total crude oil consumed by the European Union. The significance of this

factor is difficult to overestimate. Access to young and large consumer market is also a significant argument in favor of Turkey's admission to the EU.

Should be considered, that if now the GDP of the European Union is equal to the US with the accession of Turkey to the EU the union will become the strongest in the world. In addition, the European Union can speculate on the ardent aspiration of Turkey to join the EU and get some concessions from her, agree on favorable terms, political, but not of an economic nature.

What are the political advantages can get the EU from Turkey's accession to this organization? In this case, not the entire EU is implied, but only the leaders, the founding countries, directly influencing decision-making. Although the influence of these countries has been sufficiently weakened with the accession to the EU of a number of pro-American countries such as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, etc. Until now, the EU willingly accepted small, not having great influence of the country.

However, it was not taken into account that fact, when they get enough, they will significantly influence the political course of the European Union. Weakened by torn contradictions, the European Union will no longer act as a real unified political and economic force, as he originally conceived. In addition, this does not suit the main members.

The number of seats in the European Parliament depends on the country's population, thanks to which Turkey will receive a significant number of seats in the European Parliament and will be able to significantly influence the decision-making process. The leading countries, united with Turkey, will again be the center behind which the final word will remain in all disputable situations.

It is important, that the second largest army in NATO (after the US) is the Turkish army, which is also important for Europe and in recent years, Turkey has led almost independent of the United States military policy.

Not all means that the European system requires Turkey to completely break off relations with the United States. Diplomacy of Turkey for several decades demonstrated skillful maneuvering between Europe, the United States, Israel and the Muslim East with the goal of providing its own benefits. If Turkey is admitted to the European Union on the conditions described above, predictable certain rather blackmail of EU members from the Turkish side. However, it can be prevented.

Further, the already traditional view of Turkey as a bridge between Europe and the East. Skillful integration of Turkey into the European Union would help prevent a clash of Islamic and Christian civilizations in the future. Turkey became the birthplace of a new trend in Islam, which so-called Euro-Islam and Turkey's disappointment with the EU could lead to the development and strengthening of radical currents. The immediate proximity of Turkey to the borders of the European Union should make the countries of this organization attentive to problems of this kind.

For a long time Turkey has been a conductor of American interests in the region, it indicates that it can be the conductor of European interests in the Middle East. However, this aspect of the importance of Turkey is often overestimated. In the Middle East Turkey is not considered for "their own". Turkey has a number of unresolved problems with Muslim countries. Until now, these problems have mostly closed on relations with the Arab world and Turkey's cooperation with Israel (bilateral cooperation in the political, trade and economic spheres in the "military sphere, characterized as a strategic partnership") and with the United States. There are historical and ideological differences with Iran. The territorial disputes and conflicts of Turkey in the issue of the use of the Tigris and Euphrates water resources with Iraq and Syria are also relevant.

In the case of Turkey's failure to enter the European Union, one of the most likely allies of this Asian country analysts viewed Russia. At the end of 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin had a visit to Turkey, and in early 2005 - the visit of the Turkish

Prime Minister RT Erdogan (now the President of Turkey) had visit to Russia. In 2007, Russia ranked second in Turkey's foreign trade.

An important direction of the European policy of Turkey in the early 90's of XX century was the Black Sea. It is necessary to consider some aspects of this direction, since US, policy in the Black Sea basin also acquires increasingly clear contours. The American side as key views this region (including not only the water area, but also coastal areas of strategic importance, and certain regions) in plans to strengthen existing and acquire new positions in Europe. Without control over the Black Sea basin, it is hardly possible to continue the Eurasian strategy of the United States, first, in terms of control over energy communications. American military and political presence in the Black Sea basin is intended to strengthen influence of the USA in Eurasia, and to put all Europe in great dependence. At the same time, along with some integrating expansion towards internal Eurasia, the goal is to prevent the formation of "alternative alliances" which can include, as we already wrote, Turkey and Russia.

Turkey is apprehensive about the US goals, anticipating a decline in its strategic importance, the emergence of a new geopolitical configuration. As a concrete example, Turkey's fear of a possible correction or cancellation of the Montreux convention regarding the regime of the Straits.

These fears between Turkey and the US do occur, but this is not the essence of the problem at all. The US clearly does not show any interest in strengthening Turkish political and economic influence in the Black Sea basin. Especially in 1992, 10 countries of the Black Sea region, including Turkey, signed the Declaration about the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, on the basis of which was established a new regional economic organization, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Of course, the effectiveness of the BSEC activities during these past years has remained low; however, the United States has been

especially attentive and watchful of Turkey's attempts to acquire more preferable positions in this region.

In these contradictory conditions, Turkey is more concerned not with the desire of the US itself to strengthen its presence and influence in the Black Sea region, but the integration of the region into NATO. In a number of publications of Turkish and American authors, this idea is traced, although it has not been expressed so far more or less definitely. European authors did not pay attention to this circumstance at all, and it remains unclear, this position of European experts formed deliberately, or they do not pay enough attention to this problem.

Despite the unprecedented deterioration Turkish-American relations since 1998-1999, both states had political resources for maintaining relations at a level acceptable to strategic partners. Turkey could level acute angles in relations with the United States.

Turkey is much more afraid of political trends, which are manifested in NATO and in the European Union. Turkey is especially worried about the reduction of US influence in NATO, the "Europeanization" of the North Atlantic Alliance, and the emergence of the so-called "Euro-NATO" as an objective reality. Recent years we have shown that Turkey has minimal resources of influence on the European community and NATO, despite its geostrategic importance for the alliance. Even such a question as the sovereignty of Kosovo, which Turkey paid considerable attention and made efforts, seems to have decided on a purely European-American field, excluding any role for Turkey. As a result, Turkey failed to present this Kosovo project in the Islamic world as its own, at least in part.

As part of the consideration of these US plans in Europe, it can be noted that Turkey, in the existing conditions which one way or another do not meet its interests, still prefers to deal only with the United States of America, or mainly with them, than with NATO as a global integrated Security system. The inclusion

of Bulgaria and Romania in NATO has already become a blow to the interests of Turkey.

Turkey has always been pushing for the European Community. Nevertheless, Turkey has always felt that its policy in the west direction should be as far as possible from its eastern, especially the Middle East policy. Thus, these two directions of its policy will become incompatible if Europeans have the right to adjust Turkish policy in the East. Interests and the USA policy in Eurasia and the Middle East, despite the presence of many contradictions, can still be coordinated with Turkey, and there are many examples.

Some analysts believe that "ostensibly a consistent US strategy aimed at Turkey's integration into the European just a carefully disguised bluff." According to most of these authors, "the whole 40-year scenario for pushing Turkey into the European Union is nothing more than a US-British conservative project that proves the acceptability of certain political circles in the UK and the US."

It is impossible to view these opinions unequivocally: on the one hand, the Turkey place in the European system most likely, of a transit-civilizational character, and in this sense, the above sounds real. It is necessary to take into account the fact that the United States of America cannot carry out its plans for a political and military presence in Europe, especially in the Black Sea region, without Turkey at all. In addition, one cannot ignore such a synthetic task as the use of the US military presence in the Black Sea as an important lever for expanding the composition, functions and responsibilities of NATO.

The problem of Turkey in this geopolitical direction is that it is not given a choice; Turkey will have to conduct a "filigree policy of balancing and maneuvering», it is mean that is, to do what she did in the last two decades, in addition, in an even more complex international regime. In this regard, it is of interest that the political discussion on this issue, which has unfolded in Turkey since the late 90's of XX century, much ahead of the real

processes of strengthening US influence in some areas of the European continent. It becomes clear that the US efforts on the continent, along with other goals, pursue the goal of establishing restrictors in the development of Turkey's bilateral relations with individual European countries. Of course, the Americans understand this and hope for the prevailing in the Turkish military and political circles of ambitious moods of an Atlantic character. Meanwhile, in the European plans of the US Turkey remains in reserve. In general, the growing importance of Turkey for European security interests is very clearly realized in the Old World. Co-author of the new report of the European Council on Foreign Relations Mark Leonard is convinced that "Turkey is a growing regional power. Therefore, in order to keep Turkey on its side, Brussels should speed up the process of taking this country to the European Union. "This issue continues to "hang" at the level of France and Germany, which remain the main forces blocking Ankara's entry into the EU. Paris and Berlin are now much more interested in Russia, rather the development of partnership with the "great eastern neighbor" in the face of the growing need to form a unified security system throughout Europe.

In general, as Mr. Romano Prodi correctly noted, the question of whether Turkey will become a member of the European Union or not is closed for discussion: there is a decision that Turkey will be admitted to the EU after fulfilling a number of requirements.

CHAPTER IV: ATLANTIC STRATEGY OF TURKEY. FEATURES OF TURKEY-US POLITICAL RELATIONS

The foreign policy of each state is more dependent on geopolitics (geopolitics - a methodology and a form of analysis international relations).

Turkey's place in the global geopolitical context can be determined as follows: a powerful regional power of the "coastal zone" resides in a permanent geopolitical choice. The fundamental axiom of geopolitics is the fact that Turkey belongs to the "coastal zone". This fact historically arose during the course of the history of the whole of the 19th century, at the dawn of which the Ottoman Empire was still something completely different, an independent land-enclave; although - like continental Europe - it also experienced two opposite vectors - from Great Britain (Atlantism) and the Russian Empire (Eurasians).

However, in the era of empires, the contours of the final geopolitical picture were foggy, and it took centuries for these forecasts to coincide with the political map of the world: on the one hand, the United States of America, on the other, Eurasia.

Most researchers believe that today Turkey belongs to the "coastal zone", and, therefore, the geopolitical theorem of Turkish politics on a global scale is solved through the balance and opposition of two orientations - the Atlantic and Eurasian.

Turkey since the time of M.K. Atatürk has a powerful national self-consciousness, perceives its statehood as a colossal value and seeks to "play an independent and strong party in the regional context." Consequently, the historical investments in the geopolitical choice, the balance between the power lines of Atlantism and Eurasians in Turkey are huge, and represent the most important political process, which determines in many ways the course of the national path at each historical stage.

The history of the formation of modern Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire shows symmetrical waves changing orientation. Initially sandwiched between Russia and

England, Turkey was the closest to Central Europe, specifically Germany, and looked at it “as its European alter ego.” Turkey was a natural pillar of continental Europe (until the middle of the nineteenth century - Germany) in the Middle East, and on the contrary, Germany organically expressed and defended the interests of Turkey in Europe. This is also the law of geopolitics.

The real choice begins in a different context: it is a fundamental choice between Atlantism and Eurasians. Atatürk was building a new Turkey on a tough confrontation with the Atlantic project. This geopolitical choice is Eurasian.

After the end of World War II, the regional policy of Turkey began to flow from the balance between focusing on the US and NATO and the desire to maintain its national identity and regional independence. The country's foreign policy largely began to determine the obligations of the Turkish state as a member of various regional organizations, blocs, etc.

After the end of World War II, Turkish Republic became a member of UN - since 1945 (the parenting country), the IMF - since 1947, the Council of Europe - since 1949, NATO - since 1952, the OECD - since 1960, EU (associate member status - since 1963, candidate EU membership status - since 1999), Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization - since 1992.

So, the successful diplomatic tactics of London and Washington, as well as “the short-sighted policy of Stalin, who, after territorial successes in Eastern Europe, believed that the most reliable way to cope with the “coastal zone”, contributed to the strengthening of Atlantism in Turkish foreign policy - just conquer it.”

In addition, the USSR began actively support a number of Islamic (Arab) states, regional rivals of Turkey, and the West offered a guarantee and protection in exchange for joining the Atlantic strategy. In this geopolitical phase, Turkey made an Atlantic choice and began to build its policy on anti-Soviets. On the question of Northern Cyprus, the USSR took a Greek position, supported the Kurds, the Arab Baathist countries against

Israel, which further strengthened Ankara's integration towards Atlantism. However, with all this, Turkey remained an original state.

The United States also had its benefits: Turkey's secular rule restrained the growth of the Islamic factor, and Ankara's tough anti-communism made Turkey a potential adversary of the USSR. The historical contradictions between the Turks and Arabs of the Ottoman Empire put Ankara in a special position with regard to the countries of the Middle East region, which dictated, in particular, rapprochement with Israel.

The United States needed to develop a mechanism for influencing a state with a strategic geographical location, control over which would have a key impact on Middle East. In addition, American politicians had to take into account the complex of circumstances that qualitatively distinguished the Republic of Turkey.

At the same time, the US foreign policy strategy with respect to Turkey means the activity of the state aimed at including the Turkish state "in the process of creating a profitable model of international relations", including setting long-term goals and long-term planning, taking into account the correlation and application in space, and in time - no necessary resources.

Since the foreign policy strategy is implemented in relation to designed spatial units, its most important component is the geostrategic dimension associated with the achievement, maintenance and increase of power due to the possession of the most favorable spatial position (or control), using military and non-military means.

After the Second World War, the emphasis in spreading the influence of powers on geographical spaces gradually shifted from the use of "hard power" to the influence of factors of "soft power": political, economic and cultural influence. To ensure the implementation of the foreign policy strategy in relation to the object, it was necessary to ensure internal and external conditions. Internal factors:

- willingness and ability of the state leadership to take a pro-American position;
- the nature, ideology and political psychology of the management of the geostrategic object;
- the degree of consolidation of leadership and strength and its position within the country;
- the ability of the leadership to influence the opposition and influential domestic political groups, including to neutralize the former;
- the internal socio-psychological atmosphere in the country;
- external factors for the formation and implementation of the US foreign policy strategy in relation to Turkey:
- historical traditions and attitudes of state behavior in the international arena (conflict, imperial traditions, maneuvering);
- the existing level of interstate and interethnic hostility;
- the existence of security guarantees from a stronger state.

According to the definition of Z. Brzezinski, "active geostrategic actors are states that have the ability and national will to exercise power or exert influence outside their borders in order to change - to the extent that this is reflected in the interests of America - the existing geopolitical position." Proceeding from the posed paradigm, the Republic of Turkey combined the two indicated characteristics due to the West's support of its military-technical and economic potential.

The implementation of the foreign policy strategy in relation to the Turkish Republic allowed the United States to reach a higher level of scale of its implementation - regional, the impact on this spatial unit, occupying a key geographical position, which allowed to "reduce the cost" of the subject's expenses - USA for the formation of a wider favorable geopolitical environment. The US foreign policy strategy for Turkey included a combination of military and non-military factors.

The military aspect, contributing to the inclusion of American interests in Turkish politics, was close cooperation in the military-technical field, which was harmoniously supplemented

by the state's entry into the North Atlantic alliance and the deployment of a number of military bases on its territory. Along with the fact that the army has always been a key element of Turkish traditional society, it, at the same time, was its most westernized part.

After the military coups of 1960, 1971, 1980 each time a greater integration of the military into political life was consolidated (in 1997, the fourth "soft" military coup took place) and strengthening the vertical of executive power. Still military spending Turkey made up a significant part of the budget, which put the state in the constant need for external borrowing to cover them. Thus, the created situation of the technical and financial dependence of the state on its ally - the United States - was an important factor in Turkish-American cooperation.

In general, the military since the 1930s looked at itself as a guarantor of the country's internal stability and territorial integrity, the guardian of Atatürk's ideological heritage and the embodiment of the will of the Turkish nation. Therefore, in the Turkish political system, a hierarchy unusual for Western countries dominated for a long time: the army is free from political control, and political power controlled by the supervision of the military.

However, the amendments adopted at the constitutional referendum on September 12, 2010, seriously shook the usual order of things. Under the new law, people in uniform are under the jurisdiction of civil courts, especially if they are suspected of "undermining national security." The powers of the military courts are substantially curtailed.

The second key non-military factor, closely related to the first, is the economic model of the state. The economy of Turkey, built on Western loans, is developing according to the recommendations of the IMF and needs constant external borrowing due to high military spending, as well as the technological dependence of the state.

The third key element of the US foreign policy strategy regarding Turkey is the influence on the formation of the political elite and, in general, in the cultural sphere through the higher education system. This influence allows us to form a small percentage-wise, influential part of the Turkish society, which "supports the modern foreign policy of the state, aimed at close alliance with Western states and the observance of the Kemal's legacy in domestic politics."

The fourth element for achieving US geostrategic goals in relation to Turkey is the modeling of the foreign policy course through the formation of military-political blocs with the participation of the state. After the Second World War, the Republic of Turkey initiated several military-political blocs. Turkey is the first Muslim state to recognize Israel back in 1949.

From the military-political point of view on the territory of the Middle East until 2002, the most successful was the alliance of Turkey and Israel, which in many respects corresponded to the interests of the USA and Turkey. However, the relations between these countries in the current geopolitical situation in the Middle East can be considered strained. The main reason for the "cooling" of relations at the beginning of the XXI century is the change in Ankara's foreign policy after the "Justice and Development Party" (AKP) came to power in 2002, whose leader R.T. Erdogan (now the President of Turkey) headed the Turkish government.

Although the ruling party is positioning itself as a moderate Islamist party, Erdogan is increasingly pursuing a course towards active rapprochement of the country with the rest of the Islamic world, which predetermined a change in policy towards Israel, especially in light of recent events in the Middle East.

Of course, there were certain periods of crisis in relations between Turkey and the United States. Even during the periods of closest rapprochement with Washington, Ankara never behaved like a colony, but was a partner of America, making at one time a conscious geopolitical choice. In this sense, the evolution of

Turkish-American relations went through a cycle: cooperation - crisis - transformation to the strategic model - cooperation. During this evolution, the following steps can be followed:

1) 1945-1974 – since the end of World War II to the controversy over the problems of Cyprus. This period includes: a) 1945-1948. - the period of development of the American course towards Turkey and the beginning of the provision of military-technical assistance; b) 1948-1960, the formation of a system of bilateral relations (economic and military cooperation, the implementation of the American mechanism for the formation of the Turkish elite and state participation in military-political alliances with third countries) to the crisis manifestations caused by the processes and subsequent Westernization of Turkish society without visible efforts to modernize it; c) 1960-1974 - The crisis in Turkish-American relations (Cyprus crises of 1963, 1974, attempts to normalize the internal factors of the American foreign policy model through military coups in Turkey in 1960-1970);

2) 1974-1980-US application of the sanctions system against Turkey. The development of the crisis and its overcoming;

3) 1980-1991 - from the military coup in 1980 and the stabilization of relations between the two states to the collapse of the Yalta system of international relations;

4) 1991-1997 - the moment of the disintegration of the second superpower - the USSR, the manifestation of Turkey's new foreign policy activity and the Islamist government coming to power - another crisis of the American country geostrategic model, and its normalization through a military-political alliance with Israel and a “soft” military coup in Turkey in 1997. This stage is characterized by the crisis of Turkish-American relations and its overcoming

5) 1997-2007 - another military intervention in political life in Turkey and the resignation of the government. This period includes the rise to power of the political Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), the start of US

military action in Afghanistan and Iraq and Turkey's role in these campaigns, the US's desire to diversify the region's hydrocarbon exports and plans to the implementation of the project "Big Middle East Stock" through the Republic of Turkey.

6) for a short historical period, in the second half of the 80s and 90s of the 20th century, tremendous political, ideological, economic and social changes took place that shook the largest country in the world and radically changed the whole world order.

There are many interpretations of the causes of the collapse of the USSR, but not all of them are in one way or another between the two polar positions. Some believe that the collapse of the USSR is the result of defeat in the Cold War, the conscious elimination of an ideological and geopolitical competitor by external forces. Others believe that the collapse of the USSR is a natural and inevitable process embedded in the very system of the Soviet Union.

The collapse based on a systemic crisis characterized by the destruction of the integrity of the economy, the loss of controllability and the disruption of the interaction of economic, social and political systems. A long-term arms race, military, military-technical, economic assistance to the Warsaw Treaty states and the regimes of the so-called socialist orientation, support for all kinds of national liberation and communist movements, a 10-year war in Afghanistan that claimed thousands of young lives it and costing many billions of rubles, exhausted the Soviet economy.

Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Union sharply unbalanced the general situation, new and unprecedented phenomena appeared in world geopolitics. In fact, the roles and functions of the main participants of the Big Politics have changed. The collapse of the USSR and the "surrender of Moscow to Atlantism" created the precondition for a new reality of the "unipolar world". This event entailed serious consequences.

Firstly, the West itself, rather monolithic in the era of bipolarize, quickly divided into two separate poles - the United States and Europe. The virtual borderline drawn across the Atlantic began to turn into reality, instead of a united West, two geopolitical entities emerged America and Europe, with their own geopolitical interests, problems, prospects, and projects for the future world order.

The concept of "West" has ceased to be exact - and quite serious alternatives have arisen in the EU issue, in relation to the NATO bloc, and in relation to the WTO system. Europe sold its own currency, entered into "serious trade competition with the United States", pulled away from military projects of the Anglo-Saxon coalition, which in different parts of the world - in Iraq in particular - preferred to act independently from now on.

Europe has sketched its own geopolitical line, its own strategy for regional problems - in particular, in relation to the Arab world and the Middle East region. Secondly, the factor of Islamism, "fundamental Islam," has acquired a new meaning.

Created with the support of the CIA to counter pro-Soviet, pro-nationalist regimes in the Arab world (Iraq, Syria, Libya, etc.) and in the environment of continental Islam (Afghanistan), "radical Islam" changed its geopolitical function after the collapse of the USSR. "Radical Islam" was not an instrument of "Atlantic geopolitics," but an extraterritorial antagonist, the war with which, according to American strategists, "should justify the US's claim to strategic control over key points on the planet," up to the US the right to intervene in the affairs of those states whose policies would threaten American interests in the region: the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" adopted by Washington in 2002.

"Islamism" or "Islamic fundamentalism" has become a substitute for the vanished "evil empire." Although experts are not tired of explaining the difference between "Islam" and "Islamism," the masses hardly perceive such nuances. In the

“clash of civilizations” declared by Samuel Huntington, the Islamic world was clearly on the other side of the US barricades.

Thirdly, in this context of the unipolar world, the question of Eurasia in the new sense just arose for the first time. Eurasia has become an independent geopolitical concept, gradually "becoming an increasingly important factor in the newest picture of the world."

Fourth, the processes of globalization began to gain strength in the world. She touched on the information sphere, the elite, the processes of the financial sector of the economy (stock markets), and Internet users.

Moreover, the model of globalization was essentially American values spread throughout the world - liberal democracy, postmodern culture, the predominance of the financial sector over the real sector of the economy, etc. In essence, "globalization coincided with Americanization."

All these latest changes in the geopolitical picture of the world reflected in Turkish-American relations. Naturally, these processes largely affected Turkey, its geopolitical position on the scale of regional and world politics. We are against such statements that have taken place in political literature that “since the USSR and Russia ceased to be the main enemy of Atlantism (at least in the open part of US foreign policy), Turkey’s anti-Russian function in the Caucasus, Central Asia and on the Russian territory itself has lost its relevance."

Turkey has retained its strategic importance for the United States, although its role has changed. This was first apparent during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, when the United States led and mandates were granted. The air defense point in Incirlik turned out to be an unrivaled platform for air operations.

NATO reaffirmed its commitment to protect Turkey from possible attacks from Iraq and deployed military units therein. Moreover, humanitarian aid was delivered through Iraq to Turkey. In this way, Turkey has proved its strategic importance for operations in this unstable region, also after the war, when the

American and British air forces from Turkey provided a zone of a flight ban in Iraq.

In addition, after the collapse of the USSR, the main tactical task of Turkey in the field of foreign policy was to convince the United States of the advantages of using it in contacts with the new states of Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, Turkey supported the expansion of the zone of US national interests in the Central Asian region.

This refers to the strengthening of NATO positions in the region, the establishment of control over the transportation of energy resources to the world market. Overall, in the 90s. XX century in foreign policy of Turkey there was a combination of taking into account national interests with the principle of interconnection, primarily with the United States.

Due to the deterioration of Turkish-American relations in 1998-1999, the United States finally “made Turkey aware of its indifference to its plans in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and then showed the same indifference to Turkey’s economic problems”, which, according to some Turkish authors, led the country to an unprecedented systemic economic crisis. However, both states had the political resources to maintain relations at an acceptable level for strategic partners. Turkey has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to level out the most acute angles in relations with the United States, although many problems remain unresolved.

For example, certain difficulties in relations between Turkey and the United States arose after the Turkish side, due to the opposition of the parliament, was not able to provide the United States of America with the expected level of support in the development of military operations against Iraq. In March 2003, the Turkish parliament rejected the government’s request to empower it to send Turkish troops out of the country and station foreign troops in Turkey. Here, of course, the serious fears of Turkey regarding the Kurdish problem were decisive, since the de facto Iraqi Kurds, who de facto gained independence from

Baghdad automatically became a source for destabilization in Turkey. The Kurdish issue is extremely painful for Turkish statehood, and the Iraq conflict was essentially a test for Turkish-American relations.

Another important issue in Turkey's Atlantic strategy over the past decade has been the issue of Northern Cyprus. If the West gave support to Ankara at the origins of this territorial problem during the Cold War era, while the USSR stood up for the Greek Cypriots, then since the 90s. of the past century, «no proposed scenarios in general take Turkish interests into account in solving this problem."

The maximum that Washington guaranteed was a "tolerant attitude towards Turkish Cypriots as part of a single Cyprus within the framework of the European Union," as well as continuity in property matters in Northern Cyprus.

Finally, the problem of so-called "Armenian genocide" caused great tension in relations between Turkey and the USA. Adoption by the Subcommittee of the House of Representatives of a resolution on the so-called "Armenian genocide" negatively affected the trust in each other Ankara and Washington.

These problems created the basis for statements about the "crisis of Atlantism" in Turkey. Nevertheless, both the USA and Turkey understood the extreme importance of bilateral relations not only for the national interests of the two countries, but also in terms of their regional and global significance.

After a sharp peak, Turkish-US relations began to enter the stage of stabilization. Politicians began to consider ways to revive strategic partnerships. According to many analysts, both in the United States and in Turkey, "in order to maintain stable bilateral relations, a serious rethinking was required".

Since 2005, in Ankara and Washington, in order to normalize bilateral relations, a decision was made to change ambassadors, exchange delegations and expert groups on interaction at a regional level on a regular basis.

Turkish experts estimate that only 2005-2006, Turkey were visited by 49 senior US delegations representing the main US government departments: the presidential administration, the State Department, the Pentagon, both houses of Congress, all special services, including the CIA and the FBI. Not less impressive is the list of visits to the United States by high-ranking representatives of the Turkish side.

Turkish-Iranian relations after the regime change in Iran in 1979 were quite tense. Turkey feared the export of Islamic revolution, as Iranian leaders openly spoke about. Mutual rivalry in Central Asia and the Caucasus for spheres of influence after the collapse of the USSR also did not add positive to these relations.

After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2002, relations between Turkey and Iran began to acquire new content. The Turkish ruling Islamic party of the AKP impresses Iran. Improving relations was also facilitated by the emergence of new challenges and threats to security for both countries.

In January 2003, in the midst of Washington's preparations for a military action against Baghdad, Ankara made statements about the need to take any action against the regime of S. Hussein only on the basis of the decisions of the UN Security Council and pursued an active shuttle diplomacy policy in the region, the aim of which was to resolve Iraq problem by political means. In the orbit of Turkish diplomacy, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran were included.

The Iranian issue has become another reason for the new Turkish-American rapprochement. In addition to purely military problems (the provision of their territories and airspace, the use of military bases), Washington needed the assistance of Ankara in the Iranian issue, primarily for several reasons: Turkey is a Middle Eastern country; Turkey is a Muslim country; Turkey has a certain influence on the internal Iranian processes. As for Turkey, the basis for the desire to achieve mutual agreement with

Washington on the Iranian issue, then Ankara believed that the situation was the most convenient case to get out of the Turkish-American crisis of 2003 and stay in the win.

This implied, first, the opportunity to get compromise from the Americans on a number of issues vital for Turkey (the Kurdish issue, Kirkuk). On the other hand, Turkey itself is puzzled by the growing military potential of Iran, which is directly noted the doctrine of Turkish national security. Iran's becoming a nuclear power violates the Iranian-Turkish military-political balance.

Thus, Turkish politics tried to use the situation significantly weaken its regional competitor, although "in its depth the Iranian issue does not have the strategic importance that the struggle against the USSR had." Another step in rapprochement between Turkey and the United States was the 2007 visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Ankara, which can be regarded as an important point aimed at softening relations between the two states. During meetings with Turkish President A. Sezer, Prime Minister R.T. Erdogan (now President) and Foreign Minister A. Gul K. Rice said, "That serious effort will be made to create an alliance between the United States, Iraq and Turkey in the fight against the PKK." Political analysts commenting on this statement by the US Secretary of State believed that K. Rice, albeit not in plain text, but made it clear that the United States would not interfere with the prosecution of terrorists. It was perfectly obvious that the visit of the US Secretary of State had the goal of playing an important role in warming relations between the two states.

One cannot fail to note the importance of the visit of President of Turkey A. Gul to the USA in January 2008. This visit was the first after an 11-year hiatus, the visit of the Turkish President to the United States, * we can say that he consolidated the positive trends in Turkish-American relations in recent years. It is not surprising that it was during a meeting with A. Gul that the US president called Turkey the "great strategic partner" of his

country. At the same time, George W. Bush noted that both states "are fighting the common enemy - the terrorists" and designated the PKK as such a common enemy. Such assessments were the first made from the mouth of the head of the White House, which undoubtedly can be considered as a great diplomatic victory for Ankara. Recent years have become an important stage in Turkish-American relations and have been marked by the emergence of a new positive impulse that can give bilateral relations a pragmatic direction of development.

CHAPTER V: POLITICAL TIES AND MILITARY- TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND TURKEY

Azerbaijan in the Caucasus is Turkey's most natural ally. Turkish-Azerbaijani relations have a more solid foundation: common language, religion, closeness of cultural traditions.

Turkey is one of the three main states of the region (along with Russia and Iran), which play an important role in the fate of not only Azerbaijan, but also the entire Caucasus. Since ancient times, this country attached serious importance to its policy towards the Caucasus and was distinguished by active intervention in the events taking place in the region.

After the end of the Cold War, Turkey established the close relations with Azerbaijan. The contacts between Ankara and Baku began to develop literally before our eyes: cultural, linguistic, historical ties, as well as general economic, political and strategic interests affected.

With the advent of Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan, the scope of Turkish-American cooperation expanded. Moreover, the policy of G. Aliyev, who tried to prevent the isolation of Russia and Iran in the region, but at the same time firmly adhered to the course of cooperation with the West, "helped Ankara weaken the confrontation with Moscow, Tehran and Yerevan." The same model of relations persists Ilham Aliyev, whose presidency was welcomed by Turkey and the USA as a guarantee of maintaining stability in the country.

Speaking at the opening of the summit of Turkic-speaking states in Istanbul on July 15-16, 2010, Turkish President Abdullah Gul praised the integration processes in the framework of cooperation between these states. "Although the geography of our countries has great potential for cooperation, there are problems in our region that need to be addressed. To this end, the cooperation of our countries is important for our region in the matter of establishing peace and stability".

In general, today, the position of Turkey in the Caucasus is ensured mainly by Azerbaijan and Georgia, Turkey feels the need for alliance with Azerbaijan and forging close relations with it. Turkey, which, one might say, does not have a direct land connection with Azerbaijan (except for the connection with isolated Nakhchivan), has the ability to access and fully integrate into Azerbaijan and Central Asia only through Georgia, Russia and Iran.

Azerbaijan plays an important role for Turkey as an intermediary both in the Caucasus and in Central Asia and the Caspian region in communicating with other, in particular, Turkic-speaking states.

“Turkey was the first country that recognized us after the restoration of independence, and since then to the present day, in most cases, we have come forward from a single position on international issues. We have always emphasized the great importance of bilateral relations. I can say that political relations were at the highest level, and this continues today. There are probably no other two countries in the world that would so sincerely and fruitfully cooperate with each other in all fields,” said President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev at a meeting with members of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on a visit to the country . Political ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey were at the highest level, and this continues today.

The development of military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey occupies a special place in the development of relations between the two states. Turkey provided military assistance to Azerbaijan even before it created its own army. The Law on the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan, providing for the creation of a national army, was signed in 1991, however, the formation of the army of Azerbaijan dates back to 1993, it was then that it acquired a modern look.

One of the requirements was compliance with NATO standards. Turkey took a direct part in the formation of

Azerbaijani army. The foundation of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations in the military sphere was laid with the signing in the agreement August 1992. "On Solidarity and Cooperation" - military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey as a NATO member state. Later, in 1994, Azerbaijan joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program and the Azerbaijani delegation took part in the NATO session for the first time.

In 1993, an agreement was signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan, according to which the Turkish side assumed the obligation to provide Azerbaijan with light military equipment and train military specialists. With the direct participation of Turkey, a program was developed to modernize the Azerbaijani army.

An agreement on military training, scientific and technical cooperation was signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan in Ankara, which provides for cooperation in combat training of military personnel in the defense industry, as well as joint exercises. In the spring of 1999, a strategic cooperation agreement was signed. According to this agreement, Azerbaijan cannot independently decide on the start of hostilities, and Turkey guarantees the security of Azerbaijan in case of any aggression directed against it.

By decree of G. Aliyev on February 20, 1999, the Military Academy was established in Azerbaijan. Currently, classes with students are conducted according to the NATO system, and the experience of the army and the Turkish National Security Academy is widely used. On May 27, 2005, the plan of cooperation between Azerbaijan and NATO was finally approved.

Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan in recent years have been developing along the way as part of a strategic partnership. Repeatedly, including in 2011 and 2012. Joint exercises of the armed forces of Turkey and Azerbaijan were conducted. On December 21, 2010, the Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan at the plenary session ratified the agreement "On strategic

partnership and mutual support between Azerbaijan and Turkey", signed by the presidents of the two countries and the joint statement "On the creation of a high-level strategic cooperation council between Azerbaijan and Turkey".

In solving the Upper-Karabakh problem, Turkey has a special place and role. When the OSCE Minsk Group was created in March 1992, despite the insistence of Azerbaijan and Turkey, Turkey was not included to the group of co-chairing countries due to disagreement of the co-chairing states and Armenia.

For 20 years, the mediation initiatives of the Minsk Group have not yielded any results, and the problem is still unresolved. However, it is known that Armenia suffers most of all because of the unresolved problems politically, socio-economic and in terms of security.

After the declaration of independence Armenia had a hostile policy towards Turkey. Armenia has always been interested in establishing and developing relations with Turkey. But Armenia's continuing international propaganda of contrived genocide, the non-recognition of the Kars and Moscow treaties confirming the territorial integrity of Turkey, are reflected in the 11th article of the Declaration of Independence of the provision that "the Republic of Armenia requires the international community to recognize the Armenian Genocide in Western Armenia in 1915 ", regular threats against Turkey by the leaders of Armenia and others caused the fact that diplomatic relations were not established between the parties.

If Armenia, having got rid of the influence of Russia, France and the USA, were able to pursue a logical foreign policy, a security policy, then it could also establish relations with Turkey, thereby solving its economic, political, social and security problems. The problem of Nagorno-Karabakh would be solved also.

During the speech, the head of the Turkish defense department indicated that: "The close ties between our countries, based on historical roots, are strategic. "Armenia cannot continue

to continue aggression, war and occupation policy. It will not help country. What should be a peaceful settlement is also obvious. This is a peaceful resolution of the conflict based on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan. Ankara will not support a different solution. Turkey supports the Azerbaijani people "Turkey supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia". Turkish Prime Minister J. Binali during his first visit to Baku stressed that Azerbaijan and Turkey jointly participate in the implementation of global projects.

"Projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line, TANAP and TAP are a vivid example. Today Azerbaijan invests heavily in the Turkish economy. Azerbaijan and Turkey share common values on a healthy foundation, and no one can harm this friendship and this fraternity," Yildirim said.

Highly appreciating the position of the Azerbaijani side in connection with the decision on the contrived armenian genocide in the German parliament, Binali Yildirim said that historians should deal with history. It is impossible to use for political purposes the events of a century ago. Politicians who have ignored the Khojaly genocide committed in recent history are trying to assess the fictitious events of the distant past.

Thus, after the restoration of state independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, political relations and military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey are developing at a high level. Turkey's attempts to resolve the Upper-Karabakh problem are of primary importance in the relationship between the two states.

CHAPTER VI: TURKEY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WORLD ECONOMY

Turkey's long-term orientation toward to West and participation in NATO contributed to the fact that in the second half of the 70s of the XX century the socio-economic situation in the country deteriorated sharply, the cost of living increased, and inflation reached 80%. The external debt of the country was 20 billion dollars. As a result, the economic and social crisis led to a political crisis and military coups. The attempt in January 1980 to begin deep structural economic transformations faced with the inability of political structures - the government and parliament - to ensure their decisive and consistent implementation.

In November 1983, General K.Evren introduced the new government of T.Ozal, who for many years headed the government, and after as a president of Turkey and continued the policy of economic and political liberalization of the country in the direction of transition from a military form of government to a civil.

Adopted in the beginning of 1980, and then supplemented in 1983-1984 the so-called "Package of Economic Stabilization" envisaged the following broad goals and objectives:

- to carry out stage-by-stage privatization of some state-owned enterprises, increase the profitability of others, creating conditions for them to function strictly according to the laws of the market economy;
- to increase the competitiveness of national products and open the industry to external competition, having carried out for this purpose the liberalization of imports, eliminating other barriers to free movement between countries of goods, capital and services;
- to accelerate the export of Turkish products on the basis of the transition from import-substituting industrialization to export-oriented;

- sharply reduce inflation and achieve at first internal, and then external convertibility of the Turkish lira;
- eliminate the deficit of the balance of payments of the country due to the growth of revenues from external borrowed funds and the influx of private foreign capital.

The adoption of the above-mentioned program of economic reforms, containing the necessary elements for the improvement of the national reproduction mechanism, was undoubted evidence of the certain maturity of Turkish capitalism, which aimed at moving from a "closed" economy to an "open" economy through total introduction of free market trends and principles into it, and places of Turkey in the system of world economy.

Liberalization of foreign exchange policy was accompanied by liberalization of foreign trade policy: import duties have been reduced, abolished import quotas and reduced the list of goods, import of which was impossible without licensing.

Turkey, which was in the late 70s. the last century in a deep economic crisis as a result of the transition from the early 80's. XX century to a new economic strategy has made a genuine takeoff. First sharply increase growth rates of production if during the period 1978-1983. The gross product increased by an average of 2.5%, then in 1984-1990 - by 5.5; in 1992 - by 5.9% (see also table 1.1).

In these years, the activity of private national capital has considerably increased, whose products, having saturated the local market, rushed to other countries. Eventually the volume of national exports has multiplied (from 2.9 billion dollars in 1980 to 14.8 in 1992) (from 2.9 billion dollars in 1980 to 14.8 in 1992) (see: Table 1.2).

Table 1.1.**The growth rate of Turkey's GNP by major industries (in percent)**

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agriculture	2,1	8,0	10,8	11,6	0,8	3,7	3,0
Industry	9,6	3,1	3,1	9,0	3,2	3,7	6,0
services	6,8	4,1	4,1	6,6	0,8	6,4	4,5
GNP	7,5	3,6	1,9	9,2	0,3	5,9	5,0

Table 1.2.**Foreign trade of Turkey**

	1990	1991	1992
Exports of billions of US dollars	13,0	13,6	14,8
Import (billions of US dollars)	22,5	21,0	23,0
Deficiency (in %)	57,8	64,7	64,2

The significant progress was achieved and in the field of financial stabilization: managed more than twice to reduce inflation and to stabilize the national currency, the lira, which since the end of the 80s. XX century has become internally convertible. In the country was proclaimed a wide privatization program.

However, these reforms failed to change the principles of the functioning of Turkish economy, because they were half-hearted. The changes did not concern the size of enterprises and property in manufacturing industries.

In this sector of the economy, large state enterprises continued to dominate - monopolists, many of whom pursued non-economic goals. The nature of the relationship between business and the state has not changed fundamentally.

Even in the most advanced plan of liberalization of the external economic sphere, numerous restrictions were maintained, surplus control and subsidies, which in some years curtailed, in others, on the contrary, expanded.

In the early 90's. the last century, in the economy of Turkey as a whole persisted trends that characterized in the 80s. XX century. The growth rate of GNP remained positive, but unstable. GNP fell sharply (to 0.3%) in 1991 due to an unfavorable external shock caused by the war in the Persian Gulf.

The reason for this lay not only in the jump in oil prices; Iraq was Turkey's main export market, as well as an important source of hard currency for pumping oil through pipelines, while in 1993 economic growth unexpectedly jumped to a record 8.1 percent. Inflation has increased, falling in the range of 60-70%, which is unacceptably high by the standards of developed countries.

The currency and financial crisis erupted in 1994. Explaining its causes, should be taken into account the following system of macroeconomic links: the growth of budget deficits led to an increase in the government's borrowing activities in the domestic and foreign markets, as the state debt grew its short-term structure forming.

Finally, due to a dangerous increase in the share of interest payments in financing budget deficits, rushed out of the country, which led to the inevitable devaluation of the Turkish lira.

The unstable political situation in Turkey after the 1994 crisis complicated the consistent implementation of stabilization measures. The actual beginning more successful stabilization programs implemented with IMF lending assistance, was at the end of the 90's. the last century.

Accumulated public debt and the severity of service in conditions of a significant decrease in the effectiveness of new loans caused the preservation of imbalances in the sphere of state finances, and hence, the continued dependence of the economy from fluctuations in the proceeds of external financing and the reversibility of stabilization.

The crisis forced the government to urgently adopt and begin implementing a macroeconomic settlement program.

The Turkish authorities announced the program on April 5, 1994 and requested support from the IMF for its implementation.

In July 1994, a 14-month loan agreement with the Stand-by Foundation was signed, approved by its board of directors.

The main content of the program was a significant reduction in the public sector deficit and a sharp tightening of monetary policy. According to the program, fiscal measures were to reduce borrowing requirements of the public sector to 6% of GDP in 1994 and 3% in 1995. Introduced 10% additional tax on individual income and corporate profits, and government spending had to fall from 11% of GDP in 1993 to 8%.

Toughening macroeconomic policy in 1994 was not long. Despite to reduce the share of the budget deficit of GDP, generally the state could not solve the deficit problem.

The increase in interest rates caused by the tightening of monetary policy increased the government's real costs of servicing the public debt. In this way, macroeconomic populism at the end of 1995 led to a suspension and, in the final analysis, to a failure of stabilization. A significant role in the failure of the program was played by the fact that it was based on the sufficiency of macroeconomic (monetary and fiscal) policies. It did not take into account the need for carrying out serious institutional and structural reforms, without which, as once again proved the Turkish experience, the policy of macroeconomic stabilization is doomed to failure.

In essence, the stabilization program of 1994 failed to solve any of the problems of the Turkish economy.

Weakness of the budgetary system, a large and growing amount of public debt, chronic inflation, inefficiency and fragility of the banking system - this "legacy" of the past decades in the mid-90's the last century not only was not eliminated, but the beginning of even deeper roots.

There was a disproportionately large public sector for the market economy in Turkey, including state-owned enterprises. The resulting losses placed an additional burden on the budget, increased borrowing requirements of the public sector and public debt.

As a result, undermined the possibility of a long-term tough fiscal policy. It is also obvious, that privatization was an important condition for stable macroeconomic stabilization.

After the failure of stabilization in the mid-90 is the last century, the task of achieving was again on the agenda of the Turkish government in mid-1998. On June 26, 1998, the new government published a Memorandum on Economic Policy.

This Memorandum marked the beginning of an 18-month program under the supervision of the staff-monitored program. Implementation of the program began on July 1 of the same year and ended in late 1999. The main provisions of the program were as follows:

1) Fiscal policy; 2) anti-inflationary monetary and monetary policy.

Soon after the publication of the memorandum on economic policy, adopted program was assessed by the IMF Board of Directors in accordance with the fourth article of the agreement.

In the published statement, the program of the Turkish government was highly appreciated. During the execution of the program, the IMF also provided high assessment of Turkey's determination to stabilize the economy.

By the end of the 90s. of the 20th century GNP per capita amounted to 3 thousand dollars. The share of GDP was 27% and the production of agricultural products - 15.7%.

In the country annually began to produce 2 million tons of stone and 50 million tons, brown coal, about 4 million tons. oil, and the generation of electricity reached 100 billion kilowatt-hours. The country began to produce more than 75 thousand trucks and 250 thousand cars. Export of the country in the late 90's the last century reached 25 billion dollars. Country annually began to visit up to 9 million tourists.

At the modern stage Turkey's trade, policy is in full compliance with the trade legislation of the European Union. In the mid-1990s, was signed an agreement on the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU.

In accordance with this agreement, in the trade between Turkey and EU countries have been canceled all customs duties and other taxes, as well as quantitative quotas, introduced the principles of free circulation of goods. In trade with third countries, Turkey began to use customs tariffs with the EU countries. Agreement on the Customs Union with the EU obliges Turkey to enter into free trade agreements only with those countries, with which such agreements were signed by the EU countries.

The dynamics of the Turkish economy in 2000 allowed counting on the successful implementation of the program. Economic growth should have been 7%, which was higher than the planned 5.6%. In 2000, monthly inflation rates were significantly lower than those for the same period indicators of 1999 were. For 2000, inflation (by the consumer price index) was approximately 34-35%.

In December 2000, the IMF approved the assistance of Turkey for \$ 7.5 billion under the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF).

The first tranche of \$ 2.25 billion was received on December 22, 2000. Along with it were provided the fourth and the fifth tranches previously agreed loan under a stand-by agreement of \$ 550 million. At the same time, the World Bank approved a new strategy for assistance to Turkey, according to which Turkey received support of \$ 5 billion over 3 years.

As a first step in implementing this strategy, the World Bank granted Turkey a loan of \$ 778 million on streamlining the financial sector and \$ 250 million for social support for the privatization project, designed to mitigate the negative impact of privatization on state-owned enterprises.

Since February 2001, Turkish lira lost half its value against the dollar. Weak national currency had a favorable impact on the position of exporters and operators in the sphere of tourism. GDP fell by 8.5% in the first quarter (in comparison with the same period of 2000) and by 11, 8% - in the second quarter.

Generous financial support of international financial organizations kept the development of the financial crisis. Nonetheless, partially achieved stabilization of the financial crisis was violated by disagreements in the power structures, which had negative consequences for the social and economic sphere.

The Central bank announced the transition to a floating exchange rate, which opened the way to uncontrolled devaluation. In 2001, the amount of IMF loan assistance exceeded 10 billion dollars, which played an important role in overcoming the consequences of the monetary and financial crisis.

In general, since 1958 the IMF has developed 18 programs for Turkey 18 times. Western banks are interested in keeping Turkey "afloat", as its obligations to them, according to the "Economist", exceed 40 billion dollars.

In 2002-2004, in the framework of the agreement reached with the IMF on the stabilization loan, Turkey received 16 billion dollars. The main directions of its stabilization program were the reduction of government spending by giving state finances more compact and more easily controlled structure. By the end of 2004, the ratio of the public debt of GNP fell to 68% against 98% in 2001, and inflation to 9% against 70%. Already in 2002, GDP growth was 7.9%, in 2003, it was 5.9%, in 2004 - about 9% (see Table 1.3).

Table 1.3.
The growth rate of Turkey's GNP for 2002-2004. (in %)

	2002	2003	2004
GNP	7,9	5,9	9

Turkey's successes in the way of financial stabilization allowed the government to hold a denomination of the Turkish lira: since January 2005, there have been introduced banknotes, the nominal value of which has decreased by 1.000.000 times.

The government of Rajab Tayyip Erdogan continued the policy of liberalizing the economy, privatizing state concerns, opening access to the domestic market for foreign investors.

The achieved results are quite impressive in comparison with other countries. In particular, GDP growth increased from 5.8 in 2003 to 8.9% in 2004 and 4.5% in 2005.

For example, the US GDP growth in 2004 was 4.2%, the Russian Federation 7.2%, the UK 3.1%, Germany 1.6%, and China 10.1%.

Turkey currently occupies one of the leading places in the production of food products and enters the eight countries, completely providing themselves with food.

Having 28 million hectares of irrigated land and favorable climatic conditions, the country ranks fifth in the world on growing vegetables and the ninth - fruits.

The share of agricultural products in exports is also high: it is cotton, tobacco, hazelnuts, figs, raisins and citrus fruits. The processing industry is also sufficiently developed; its annual growth is 25%. The most developed production of tomato paste, fruit juices, canned and frozen vegetables and fruits.

Turkey ranks second in Europe and the third in the world for the production of tomato paste, ketchup and tomato puree (130 thousand tons per year). Turkey - the world's second largest exporter of pasta.

The place of Turkey in the world classification:

- the first place in the world for the production and export of dried fruits (figs, apricots)
- the first place in Europe for the production of cotton and tobacco
- the second place in the world for the production of lentils, raisins and green peas
- the fourth place in the world for the production of olive oil
- the fifth place in the world for the production of sunflower seeds
- the sixth place in the world for the production of beans

- the seventh place in the world for the production of sesame
- the eighth place in the world for the production of flour and sugar.

Recently, Turkey has become one of the countries that are rapidly expanding the production of poultry meat. In 1999, its production grew by almost 60% compared with 1995. Per capita consumption of poultry meat in the country has reached 11 kg per year (red meat - 14 kg).

The economy of Turkey is a complex association of a modern industry and traditional agriculture, which is still up to 30% in the GDP structure. Although Turkey has a relatively strong and rapidly growing private sector, the state remains the main participant in the main industries, banking sector, transport and communications.

The weak point in the Turkish economy is the lack of capital, which limits the opportunities for economic growth. Turkish banks are still 80% financed by public debts, capital markets in the country are poorly developed, foreign direct investment is too small.

In 2003, they covered a quarter current account deficit. Over the past 10 years, 900 million dollars have been received annually in Turkey. The Turkish monetary system is also not stable enough. Instability is due to the high dependence on the tourism sector of the economy.

The inflation rate for the first four months of 2008 was 4.72%. The growth rate of the Turkish GDP in 2007 was 5.3 %. The unemployment rate in 2007 was 10.2%. External debt as of June 30, 2007 amounted to 226.4 billion dollars, which corresponds to 58% of GDP.

Over the past few years, Turkish foreign debt has grown significantly. This is because the state in search of funds to finance the budget deficit noninflationary methods released on the market of government securities and began to resort to external loans. The share of state interest is about 35-40% of all government spending. Such policy has led Turkey's foreign debt

amounted to \$ 207.8 billion at the end of 2006. At the end of June 2007, rising 9 percent, it was already 226.4 billion dollars. The main investors in the Turkish economy historically are Germany and the United Kingdom, but recently high investment activity Netherlands and the USA.

Turkish cars are delivered in 163 countries of the world. The main consumer is France, buying from Turkey cars for \$ 1.86 billion. It is followed by Germany, Italy, Britain and Belgium.

Table 1.4

Turkey's GDP growth rate, %

year	value
2003	5.3
2004	9.4
2005	8.4
2006	6.9
2007	4.7

Table 1.5

Turkey's export volume, billion US dollars

year	value
2003	35.1
2004	49.1
2005	69.5
2006	71.5
2007	85.2

Today, the Turkish economy is becoming more open. It cannot be denied Turkey has taken many important steps to improve the economic situation, and very successful. Gradually Turkey establishes trade relations with the countries of the European Union, which is very profitable for Turkey.

The economic problems of the country remain the energy issue and the issue of water supply. The Turkish energy strategy is multidimensional. One way to solve the country's energy supply problem is the creation of joint pipelines.

The creation of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline ensures both the internal needs of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and the export of energy resources.

The problem of water supply also remains one of the important economic problems not only for Turkey with its arid climate, but also for neighboring states.

In this way, today the Turkish economy "can be called a market economy in the context of the current stabilization and the success of the ongoing reforms."

In comparison with other EU candidate countries, Turkey's economy is much more powerful, than for example, the economies of Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, also, the growth rates of the Turkish economy outstrip even the indicators of Finland. High rates of economic growth allow Turkey more and more apply for membership in the EU.

Turkey is the first state to recognize the independence of the sovereign Republic of Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991, today Turkey is Azerbaijan's strategic partner in world politics and a state that provides comprehensive support to Azerbaijan.

On May 3, 1992, during an official visit to Baku by the Turkish government delegation, diplomatic relations were established between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The signing of the "Contract of the Century" on September 20, 1994, with the Turk Petrolary foreign companies was a real manifestation of the development of strategic cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan. All five international consortia associated with the Azerbaijani oil and gas sector have a share of Turkish capital

Important agreements on economic cooperation signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan "Agreement on cooperation in tourism between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the Republic of Turkey", "Agreement on

trade and economic cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the Republic of Turkey”, “Protocol on scientific, technical and economic cooperation in agriculture ”, “Protocol on cooperation and mutual assistance in customs between Azerbaijani Republic and the Republic of Turkey "and many others prove once again the development of Turkish-Azerbaijani intensively.

At a military parade in the Azerbaijani capital on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the liberation of Baku by Turkish forces, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev noted that "Azerbaijan will invest \$ 20 billion in the Turkish economy. We are successfully implementing joint energy and transport projects that create energy and transport maps of Eurasia." Ilham Aliyev called six meetings with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held in 2018 as an indicator of a high level of trust and relations between the two states.

In 2003, there were 8 Turkish construction projects worth \$ 55 million in Azerbaijan, and in 2007 were 6 projects worth \$ 849 million.

In general, Azerbaijan is one of the important markets for Turkish goods in the Caucasus. Turkish exports to Azerbaijan over 10 years (2001-2011) increased by more than 9 times.

If in 2010 the share of lira in exports was only 2.6 %, now this figure has exceeded 13 %. In import, the share of the national currency of Turkey over the same period increased from 3.1 to almost eight percent. Already in 2017, according to the State Customs Committee of Azerbaijan, trade with Turkey amounted to \$ 2.64 billion, of which \$ 1.37 billion was exported to this country. Trade turnover between the two countries in 2017 increased by 14.8 %.

According to the Turkish political scientist Engin Ozer, “And the fact that the countries of the region support the appeal of Turkey to implement commodity circulation in national currency should be treated normally. In fact, the initiative launched by Turkey can be called a project to clean up trade in the whole of

Asia from the dollar and the euro. If this attempt by Turkey becomes successful, then in many developing countries there will be exchanges that will not be threatened by financial speculators. As you know, in African countries, the dollar played the role of the reserve currency, the Chinese yuan began to prefer. In addition, I believe that the dominance of the US dollar in the market has psychological reasons. "

In 2019, the share of trade between the two countries amounted to 13.54% of total foreign trade, Azerbaijan's export to Turkey amounted to \$ 2 billion 862 million 694 thousand. In the reporting period, Azerbaijan's imports from Turkey amounted to \$ 1 billion 646 million 801 thousand.

Speaking about the main imports of Turkey, it should be noted: oil, industrial raw materials, machinery and equipment, building materials, car engines, consumer goods, iron and steel, chemicals, fertilizers, cattle. The main export items of Turkey: agricultural products and food products (including dates, nuts, dried fruits) textiles and clothing, tobacco, leather, glass, refined oil. Natural resources: chromium, copper, quicksilver, antimony, coal, oil, natural gas, iron ore, salt. Ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, machine building and metalworking, shipbuilding, chemical, oil refining, textile and food industries are developed.

In a special report devoted to the analysis of the current situation in Turkey, the London weekly Economist drew attention to the "unusually high activity" in its national economy and noted that "the pace of the country's development will in all probability be more significant than in almost any European country. " In 2011, Turkey was in third place in the world after China and Singapore, excluding some small countries that do not play a significant role in the global economy.

Thus, Turkey, the first to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan, pays special attention to the development of not only political, but also trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. With each year, the commodity circulation of the

two countries is growing, leading to the strengthening of both states in the region of the Middle East, the South Caucasus.

Modern Turkey is an agro-industrial developing state. Over the years of the Republic of Turkey, significant changes have occurred in the economic, political and cultural life of Turkish society.

Turkey, a country chronically backward and burdened by serious social problems in the 70s of the last century, has turned into one of the most dynamically developing countries in the world with GDP confidently approaching 1 trillion. dollars. In comparison with the countries of the East, as well as with some countries of the West, Turkey in the postmodern era became an “oasis” of economic tranquility.

The Turkish economy is a complex combination of fairly modern industry and traditional agriculture, which still accounts for up to 30% of GDP. Although a relatively strong and rapidly growing private sector has formed in Turkey, the state remains the main participant in the main industries, banking, transport and communications.

Today, the country occupies one of the leading places in the capitalist world for the production of leguminous crops (over 25 million tons), in particular wheat (5th place), a number of other crops - cotton (5th place, for export 2nd), tobacco (4 place), dried fruits, nuts, wool (6th place), as well as chrome ore and the production of ferrochrome (2nd place), copper ore and blister copper, etc.

The government of Rajab Tayyip Erdogan continued the course towards economic liberalization, privatizing state concerns and opening up access to the domestic market for foreign investors. The results achieved are quite impressive compared to other countries. In particular, GDP growth increased from 5.8 in 2003 to 8.9% in 2004 and 4.5% in 2005.

However, despite these indicators, the gross national income per capita in Turkey in 2005 was \$ 2,790, and was considered by world standards to be below average income. For comparison,

one can cite income in the same year in Russia - \$ 2610, Ukraine - \$ 970 and Germany - \$ 25,250. About 19.9% of the country's population used various loan programs. Gross outstanding external debt remains a key risk. In 2002, when the AKP came to power, the gross outstanding external debt was \$ 130 billion. In 2019, it reached \$ 453 billion, of which \$ 119 billion are short-term liabilities.

Currently, most of the investment comes from the Middle East, Russia and other non-Western countries, unlike the previous decade.

The Turkish government pays great attention to trade and economic relations with Arab countries and Iran. In general, its foreign economic policy has several directions in the region:

1) since 2000, the volume of trade relations with Arab countries and Iran has grown in absolute - from several billion to more than \$ 30 billion, and the share of Middle East countries in Turkish exports has increased from 12.5% to 22.5 %

2) the vector of economic integration of Turkey in the region also includes Iran and Pakistan. The strategic plan is to turn the region of West Asia into a "factory", whose products will be sold in the markets of the Middle East, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus.

3) another direction of Turkish integration policy is directed to Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Interest in the region rich in hydrocarbon reserves is quite natural. To meet the needs of its economy, Turkey has increased the consumption of natural gas since 1990 by more than 800%, which in absolute terms now amounts to 35 billion cubic meters per year.

All these indicators mean a multiple increase in the current energy consumption in the Mashriq region, now estimated at 40 billion cubic meters per year.

In February 2017, President R.T. Erdogan toured the Persian Gulf region, visiting Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Along with other political issues (FETO, Syria and Iraq), of the economic agenda were also addressed.

In June 2017, a number of countries, including Bahrain, Egypt and the UAE, accused Qatar of supporting and financing terrorism and broke off their diplomatic relations with it. Turkey did not recognize the “punishment” of Qatar, on the contrary, it accelerated the opening of its military base on its territory, sending its troops and weapons there. Turkey reaffirmed its commitment to meet Qatar's food supply needs and eased the announced embargo. Exports from Turkey to Qatar increased by 48% for the period from January to November 2017.

The Turkish Prime Minister at the opening ceremony of the embassy said that “Turkey and Qatar have a common opinion on regional and international issues. We are doing our best to turn our region into a peaceful haven. ”

From a political point of view, the Qatar embargo was a good opportunity for Turkey to further strengthen the country's economic opportunities in the region and strengthen the political position of Turkey in the Gulf.

In general, according to the Ministry of Economy of Turkey, according to the results of 2017, the trade turnover of Turkey with the countries of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf grew by 22.1% over the year - up to 56.4 billion dollars.

In 2017, Turkish exports to the Middle East and the Gulf countries grew by 13.6% to \$ 32.7 billion. Imports from this region also grew by 36.3% to \$ 23.6 billion.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) announced that Turkey increased arms exports by 170% from 2014 to 2018 compared with the previous four-year period. For example, 30% of Turkey’s total arms exports were purchased by the United Arab Emirates, followed by Turkmenistan with 23%.

According to R.T. Erdogan “In the next four years, when elections are not expected in Turkey, the government will implement the roadmap for economic development and achieve the goals set before 2023,” the president said.

By the end of 2016, Iran became the largest oil supplier to Turkey, occupying 26.7% of its market. In July 2017, at the peak

of Tehran's production of "black gold", Ankara already purchased over 37% of its oil from Iran.

From the analysis done, we can conclude that today the Turkish economy is becoming more and more open. It cannot be denied that Turkey has taken many important steps to improve the economic situation, and very successful ones. However, the political situation in the region greatly affects the economic cooperation of countries. For example, instability in Syria, Iraq and Yemen leads to a break in economic stability, which in turn negatively affects the Turkish economy. The events around these countries, in which the armed clash is growing, leads to an increase in defense spending in Turkey, which is an additional burden on the state budget of the country.

The US market has always been ideal for Turkey and is second only to Germany.

Among the goods of Turkish export, the main ones are: minerals, outerwear and accessories, metal products, tobacco products, carpets, agricultural products, furniture and so on. From the United States, Turkey imports mainly household appliances, medical equipment, chemicals, weapons, stationery, toys, alcoholic beverages, etc. Over the past few years, the statistical indicators of mutual imports and exports of both countries have changed.

Trade between Turkey and the United States of America for 1991-2007 was implemented on the basis of the following bilateral agreements and contracts:

1. Investment Agreement (June 6, 1991);
2. Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (June 14, 1994);
3. The so-called agreement "Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment" (May 5, 1995);
4. Agreement on cooperation in the field of customs policy (March 28, 1996);
5. Agreement on the Turkish-American Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation (December 27, 1996);

6. Agreement on the development of bilateral trade and investment cooperation (September 29, 1999);

7. Joint Communiqué of the Bilateral Economic Committee (March 24, 2000, Washington);

8. Joint Communiqué of the Trade and Economic Council (July 12, 2001, Ankara);

9. Agreement on the establishment of the Turkish-American Business Council (February 26-27, 2002);

10. Bilateral agreements during the conference of the Turkish-American Business Council (March 16-19, 2003);

11. Joint Communiqué of the Bilateral Trade and Economic Council (January 23-24, 2006).

Among these agreements and arrangements there are strategically important ones that influence the political relations between the two states. For example, in 2000, Turkey signed an agreement with the United States on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is believed that this agreement will allow Turkey to receive assistance from the United States on training, the acquisition of technology, and conducting joint research in the field of the study of the peaceful atom. The treaty also contains a number of different restrictions on the acquisition of enriched uranium in the United States. It is noted that specific technologies are categorically not subject to transfer to Turkey, and the nuclear energy program will not be used by the country for military purposes.

In connection with the issue of cooperation in the field of nuclear programs, recent shifts can be noted: for example, in 2006 the United States decided to help Turkey build eight nuclear reactors: on February 9, 2006, Washington met with Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources H. Guler and his American Counterpart S. Bodman. They discussed possible cooperation, after which they visited the American nuclear powerplant. According to H. Guler at this meeting, a sharp increase in oil prices made Turkey think about the need to expand the range of energy sources. In addition to the development of

nuclear energy, Turkey plans to build new hydroelectric power stations, privatize coal mining and expand the network of oil pipelines. Exxon Mobil, Shevron Texaco and BP were planned to attract oil fields.

It should be noted that the demand for electricity in Turkey is constantly growing: in 2005 alone, consumption increased by 8%. In 2006-2007 the total capacity of the country's existing power plants was about 28.3 megawatts, of which 16.6 megawatts are produced by thermal power plants, and 11.7 by hydroelectric power stations. The nuclear reactors with which the United States will help Turkey will increase installed capacity by 5 megawatts.

Turkish - American economic cooperation in the field of energy exploitation over the past 10 years has expanded significantly in the territories of strategically important regions of the planet. So, since 1995, the US government has provided great support to the project of the Turkish route for the transportation of Caspian oil and gas resources, which was necessary to ensure regional security, economic independence and trade development, and also was of great importance for Turkish-American relations. Turkey, for its part, intends to become an important element of the Eurasian Energy Corps (EEC - European Economic Corridor), the creation of which is supported by the United States. That is why both Turkey and the United States of America paid great attention to the project of the main Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan export pipeline and the export of Azerbaijani gas along the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum route, as components of the EEC.

We have already written about the initial period of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, as regards its role in the development of Turkish-American economic relations, it should be noted first of all that this project, as well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum project, were accompanied by Turkey some difficulties. The fact is that the unprecedented recession of the Turkish economy led in the late 90s. last century to a drop in energy demand and, as a result, cast doubt on Turkey's ability to purchase gas from the Shah Deniz field.

According to American analysts, Turkey owed its energy problems to the coalition of the parties Dogru Yol (The Right Way) and Ana Veten (The Homeland), which arose in 1996, whose representatives held leading positions in the next 6 years at the ministry of energy. It was during these years that Turkey actually became dependent on gas supplies from Russia, envisaging the implementation of the Blue Stream project, although Ankara continued to be a strategic partner of the USA, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the implementation of the Eurasian Economic Corridor.

Meanwhile, Turkey was able to once again demonstrate its significance as an influential player in the regional political scene. This is confirmed by the official opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline in Turkey on July 13, 2006, the Azerbaijani side of which opened in May 2005. This project is also called the "Silk Road of the XXI Century." Its total length is 1774 kilometers. The longest section of the pipeline, 1,074 kilometers, runs through Turkey; 440 kilometers - on the territory of Azerbaijan and 260 kilometers laid on the territory of Georgia. Turkey, having invested 1.3 billion dollars in the construction of its site, will annually receive only 250-300 million dollars for transit through its territory.

According to Turkish political scientist Fattih Aslan, the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline "will completely change the geopolitical situation in the region," "a number of terminals and pipelines will be built in Turkey in the coming years with the participation of foreign companies." The political scientist believes that in the future, Turkey will become "the most important energy transit hub for the transportation of hydrocarbons to Europe." Turkey will become "one of the key players in Central Asia, and Georgia and Azerbaijan are striving to strengthen their energy independence from Russia," F. Aslan continues.

It should be noted that the cost of implementing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project as a whole is \$ 4 billion. The throughput

of the pipeline is 50 million tons of oil per year, which makes it possible to pump 1 million barrels of oil daily through the pipe.

With the commissioning of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, the United States solved the main political task of creating an alternative, bypassing the territory of Russia, channel for transporting oil from the Caspian region, which reduces the dependence of some of the region's producing countries on Moscow.

The total recoverable oil reserves of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli fields were estimated by experts at 890 million tons. Their mining will be conducted until 2024.

In terms of security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the most problematic point from this point of view is the Georgian section of the pipeline. Confrontation of Tbilisi with individual subjects of the republic is very dangerous for the project. PKK militants can also bring some trouble in the security sector for the pipeline in the Turkish section, although they understand that the attack on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan could be the "last straw" that will overwhelm not only Ankara, but also Washington's main .

Ankara, with the launch of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, solved its main strategic task - it took another important step along the path of "turning Turkey into the most important transit and distribution country for oil products". Ceyhan is becoming one of the most important oil ports in the world, which means that the strategic importance of Turkey in the world community is growing, investment in the country's energy market will increase, which, according to experts, will "digest" \$ 130 billion of foreign investment over the next 25 years. This forecast has already been confirmed in 2005-2006.

So, from 1993 to 2003 the volume of foreign capital in the Turkish market was at 1.1 billion dollars. In 2005, the volume of foreign investment in the Turkish economy amounted to \$ 9.7 billion.

After the successful opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the turn came for the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas

pipeline, the project of which Washington persistently lobbied. The United States attached great importance to the implementation of the project.

The preparatory work for the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline was fully completed by the beginning of 2007. The official opening took place on March 25, 2007, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey attended the gas pipeline opening ceremony. The first gas flow through Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum was launched on December 13, and gas from the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz field reached Georgia on December 15.

The length of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline is 970 km (442 km in Azerbaijan, 248 km in Georgia and 280 km from the Georgian-Turkish border to Erzurum). The participants in this project are: British BP - 25.5%, Norwegian Statoil - 25.5%, Russian-Italian LUKA gip - 10%, French Total - 10%, SOCAR - 10%, Iranian VICO - 10%, Turkish TRAO - 9%. Thus, this project was developed by leading world oil and gas companies with the active participation of Turkey, which does not hide the desire to shift the geopolitical focus of gas supplies to the European market.

It is clear that Turkey seeks to position itself as an “energy bridge between the East and the West”, striving to take into account not only domestic demand, but also excessive volumes of supplies for subsequent transit to Europe when developing gas and oil projects. Already today, a well-developed network of oil - (2300 km) and gas pipelines (4700 km) covers the Turkish territory, and the implementation of promising pipeline projects will expand it to 3400 km and 7700 km, respectively.

The continuation of this strategy can be considered the development of the Turkish-American alliance in the oil and gas fields of Turkmenistan. The Turkish company Chalyk Energy and the American Parker Drilling, in partnership with the state concern Turkmenneft, completed the construction of two wells in 2005. In the process of testing wells, industrial inflows of

hydrocarbons were obtained. The project aimed at increasing the efficiency of oil and gas field development by increasing the volume of exploration and production drilling started in the west of Turkmenistan back in 2003.

Within its framework, the state concern Turkmenneft and Chalyk Energy have signed a contract worth \$ 240 million for the implementation of services for drilling wells. The main subcontractor of the project was Parker Drilling International Inc. (USA), whose task was to provide technical and construction support for new hydrocarbon sources with powerful drilling rigs and materials. In accordance with the planned program, by the end of 2005, the Turkish-American Alliance commissioned 7 gas wells at the Korpeje field and 6 oil wells at Akpatlavuk.

In 2006, while continuing to drill Akpatlavuk, Chalyk Energy and Parker Drilling expanded the geography of the partnership by connecting to the development of natural resources of new promising structures in southern Turkmenistan. A well with a designing depth of 3600 m was laid in South Yolatan Square.

Summing up the issue of economic cooperation between Turkey and the United States of America, we note that the end of the twentieth - the beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by the intensification of globalization in all areas of the world economy. The globalization of economic relations, which is understood as the process of forming a single world economic space through the cross-border movement of mobile financial resources based on the use of the latest technologies and coverage of an increasing number of countries, is a process that attracts great attention, as fast and comprehensive, as controversial and fraught with conflicts.

It is also obvious that globalization affects all aspects of the socio-economic life of almost all countries of the world and that this process is objective and irreversible. As globalization processes deepen, more and more specific tasks are brought to the fore.

In the context of globalization and the formation of a "new economy" in Turkey such strategic goals of economic development were put forward as the creation of modern sectors of the economy and the expansion of international investment relations, including with a long-standing partner, that is, with the United States.

Such an economic strategy raises the status of Turkey and determines its inclusion in solving global problems (and not just economic ones) as an active participant, and not as a passive recipient of foreign assistance.

The energy policy of Turkey at the present stage of development is subordinated to this strategy. Turkey, which has become the largest transit point for energy resources from the Caspian region to Europe, is interested in strengthening its transit positions and becoming a full-fledged (and even monopolistic) regional energy corridor not only between the East and the West, but also between the North and the South.

Thus, new economic projects can become a new impulse of traditional allied relations between Turkey and the United States of America, which give bilateral economic relations a more pragmatic direction of development.

At first, Turkey sought to collaborate even more closely with the countries of the Far East, and in particular, with Japan, and not only Turkish political, but also business circles made efforts. Turkey had several goals for closer cooperation with Japan.

Firstly, it gave Turkey a market, attracted Japanese investors to Turkey. All this, in turn, strengthened and developed the Turkish economy, which allowed it to pursue an independent and independent policy from the United States.

It's no secret that the Turkish economy has long been distinguished by its instability and economic crises. However, thanks to the efforts of the AKP, as the ruling party, it was possible to stabilize the "floating" economy of Turkey.

In the postmodern era, Turkey frantically sought to join the EU and carried out certain reforms along this path. Japan

supported Turkey's aspiration for the EU, thereby proving its importance for Turkey.

R.T. Erdogan on the importance of Turkish- Japanese relations in 2015 said: "125 years ago, Sultan II Abdulgamid sent the Ertogrul ship to Japan with a personal message and gifts for the Japanese emperor Meiji. On the way back, the ship crashed off the coast of Kushimoto. The local population, in spite of great risks, hastened to help the Turkish sailors and rescued them.

This historical fact is very dear to us, it reflects the sincerity of relations between our peoples. " The Turkish president also stated that "In 1985, during the Iran-Iraq war, 215 Japanese citizens could not leave Tehran for a long time. Then the THY Turkish Airlines plane took them on board and delivered them to Japan, thereby repaying the debt to the Japanese people. "

At the end of 2014, economic relations with Japan amounted to only about 3.6 billion dollars. Increasing the volume of trade is one of the main tasks of Turkish-Japanese relations, which so far has not been resolved despite various declarations and statements. It is clear that the development of economic relations between Turkey and Japan is hindered by the geographical remoteness of countries from each other. But it is also worth noting that Turkey is a member of the EU Customs Union and can sign a free trade agreement only with the country that has entered into a similar agreement with the European Union. Tokyo is in talks with Brussels on this issue, but they have not yet ended.

After the government of Japan of Turkey allocated an ODA loan of \$ 30 million, Japanese firms were not able to win the bridge across the Strait interstate tender. At the same time, representatives of the government, official circles and private firms in Japan believed that winning a tender for the "Bridge across the Strait" project would serve as a powerful impetus for the further development of bilateral relations. According to officials of Japanese firms, the main reason for losing the tender was a lack of knowledge of Turkey. After the failure of the

tender, the Japanese began to prepare to send an “economic delegation” to Turkey.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe signed a protocol according to which only Japanese companies will be involved in the construction of plants for the combustion of carbon dioxide, sulfur and other waste generated from the extraction of natural gas: JGC, Chiyoda, Mitsubishi, Sojitz and Ito Shyoji. The amount of investment in this project can reach two trillion yen.

Cooperation in the field of culture also proves the sincerity of relations between the two countries. For example, in Japan 2003 was declared the year of Turkish culture, and in 2006, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi paid an official visit to Turkey. As President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul paid an official visit to Japan. What was a turning point for an even closer rapprochement between the two countries?

In 2007, during the visit of A. Gul to Japan, a Turkish-Japanese working forum was created, the purpose of which is to bring the Turkish and Japanese business elites closer together. 2010 was declared the year of Japanese culture in Turkey, which created even more conditions for the development of bilateral relations. Among the main 189 events covering the cities of Izmir, Mersin, Ankara, Shafranbolu, Kaman and others, a week of Japanese films should be noted. Japanese kimono demonstrations and concerts by Japanese drummers.

CHAPTER VII: MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE USA

Considering the problem of military-technical cooperation between Turkey and the United States, first, it should be noted that this country is a member of NATO. The fact Turkey at the end of World War II supported the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition allowed it to aspire to join the North Atlantic Union immediately after the creation of this organization. However, the first attempts to enter the bloc made in 1950 by the government of A. Menderes were unsuccessful. A number of countries, such as Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the United Kingdom, opposed Turkey's admission to NATO. Participation of Turkey in Korean war (1950-1953) managed to enlist the support of the United States. So policy became a trump card for Turkish government. The Turkish Republic was actually the only state that provided its troops for direct participation in this war.

The protocol on Turkey's admission to NATO was signed in London on October 17, 1951. Since that time, the process of active military construction in the country and the rearmament of the Turkish army according to NATO standards begins. In Turkey, more than 100 airdromes and military bases were built, and many new roads were laid. The largest air base was established in Incirlik, the largest military port in Iskenderun. Turkey secured the receipt of US military loans. Only from 1947 to 1949, received 175 million dollars for military spending. Turkey also took advantage of the Marshall Plan. Turkey's NATO allies also assisted in the modernization of the Turkish army by providing various assistance to it.

The Turkish military-industrial complex over the years of its development has achieved serious success. On its basis, 20% of military equipment produced by the Turkish army is produced. 4 frigates, 8 submarines were built, more than 250 F-16 combat aircraft were assembled, about 60 SN-235 military transport

aircraft, 30 Cougar helicopters, more than 3,000 armored combat vehicles, as well as other main and auxiliary military products.

The regular armed forces number 515 thousand people. Of these, 402 thousand are ground forces: 4 army headquarters, 10 corps, 3 divisions (2 infantry), and 48 brigades (17 armored, 15 mechanized, 11 infantry, 5 special purposes, of which 2 armored military, mechanized and infantry brigades), 11 regiments (presidential guarded-hot, five border infantries, 4 aviation), 26 separate battalions of border guards. More than 4,200 tanks, 650 infantry fighting vehicles, 3,643 armored personnel carriers, 2015 towed and 868 self-propelled guns, more than 1,600 anti-aircraft artillery guns, 168 aircraft and about 300 helicopters are in service. The number of air forces is 60 thousand people. There are 480 combat aircraft. 53 thousand people serve in the Navy, including 3 thousand in the Marine Corps. The fleet includes 13 submarines, a large number of ships of various classes (26 frigates with guided missile weapons, 21 missile boats, 18 patrol boats, 24 minesweeping ships, and 29 small landing ships). The combat training is mainly subordinated to solving tasks that meet the requirements of the NATO command and is carried out in close coordination with the general tasks of the bloc.

The ground forces of the Republic of Turkey are deployed in accordance with the operational plans of the North Atlantic Alliance. The 1st Field Army (headquarters in Istanbul) is located in the Black Sea Straits and East Thrace (the European part of Turkey); 2nd Field Army (headquarters in Malatya) - in the areas of the southern borders of the country; 3rd Field Army (headquarters in Erzincan) - in the districts adjacent to the borders of Armenia; 4th (Aegean) field army (headquarters in Izmir) - in the areas of the coast of the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. Separate army corps are deployed in Central Anatolia and in the northern part of the island of Cyprus.

On the territory of the Greater Caucasus, practically throughout the north-eastern part of Turkey, about a third of its entire army is deployed - the 3rd Field Army, consisting of the

8th and 9th Army Corps, the 48th Separate Infantry Brigade and part forces of the 2nd Field Army (7th Army Corps). The 9th AK has in its composition: 3rd Motorized Infantry Division, 7th, 14th, 25th, separate mechanized brigades, separate motorized infantry battalion, separate tank battalion, which is deployed in the Ardagan area, Kagysman, Erzurum. The eighth AK includes the 10th separate infantry brigade, the 1st, 12th, 34th, 42nd separate mechanized brigades, the ninth separate armored brigade and the 151st CSIR artillery regiment located along the Turkish-Iranian border. In addition, compounds of the second PA-7th AK are deployed on the Iran-Turkey border: the 61st and 70th separate mechanized brigades, the 16th and 20th separate armored brigades, the second, 5th, 23rd separate infantry brigades. The actions of the army are supported by the second tactical air command and in the coastal direction by the actions of the command of the navy.

All these statistics on the Turkish army are given in order to identify the role of this institution in the development of Turkish-American relations. To this day, the United States remains interested in the existence of large and capable Turkish armed forces, due to the strategic importance of Turkey. The military cooperation between Turkey and the United States allows for a key impact on Turkey's foreign and domestic policies and helps strengthen Washington's position in this state and region.

During the Gulf War in the early 90's. last century, the United States hoped for comprehensive, including military assistance, from the North Atlantic Alliance as an ideal cover and support. Among its allies in NATO, the United States regarded Turkey as a mighty outpost in the south, where the rich oil sources of the Arab states are located. Indeed, Turkey took an active part in the anti-Iraq coalition. Shortly before the start of Operation Desert Storm, Ankara sent an additional contingent of troops of over 40 thousand troops to the Iraqi border. In addition, Turkey allowed the United States to significantly increase the number of aircraft based on the air force in Incirlik.

In connection with the aggravation of the situation in Iraq, the United States hoped for further cooperation with Turkey. However, officially Ankara refused to take part in the coalition forces in the war against Iraq in 2003. For the first time in decades in a critical situation, the leadership of the General Staff, which tried to influence parliament and the government in order to achieve direct participation of Turkey in the anti-Iraq coalition, did not achieve its goal.

Under these conditions, it was difficult for Prime Minister R.T. Erdogan to conceal the disagreement with the Chief of the General Staff, and the country could, according to some observers, be on the verge of another military coup. In general, the problem of independence (primarily military) of Ankara from Washington became extremely urgent after 2003. Let us consider in this context in more detail aspects of this problem.

Over 80% of the armaments and military equipment of the Turkish Armed Forces are american-made. First, they include the most high-tech effective weapons systems, the operation of which is extremely difficult without the technical and personnel assistance of the United States. It gives Washington a very effective lever of pressure on Turkey. In this regard, the Air Force is the most vulnerable as the most high-tech and difficult to maintain and support the armed forces.

Another important aspect is modern ammunition. The armament of the Turkish Armed Forces consists of a number of types of precision-guided munitions (guided aerial bombs and missiles, anti-aircraft guided missiles, etc.), the rates of which are carried out from the USA. In the case of the development of intense hostilities, its reserves, as a rule, are quickly exhausted and their renewal depends on the USA. It is notable even so ally of the US as Israel, after a limited war as the Second Lebanon (2006), today is forced actively replenish its arsenals, buying high-precision aviation ammunition, anti-tank guided missiles in the United States, etc.

The Turkish army in its history experienced a crisis in providing technical readiness, albeit on a smaller scale. For example, after the Cyprus events of 1974, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, and, in particular, the implementation of programs to upgrade the Air Force's fleet was suspended. According to some estimates, in the mid-70s of the last century, the effectiveness of the Turkish Air Force was reduced by 50%.

In the early 80's XX century begins the "new renaissance" of Turkish-American military cooperation. Despite the dynamic development, due to the limited capabilities of the Turkish economy and insufficient budget allocation for the military-industrial complex, the Defense Industry Development and Support Fund was created in 1985 with a view to its subsequent using by the Ministry of Defense.

Because of the development of the existing infrastructure, the army began to receive weapons in the early 90s. The new systems based on the using of the most modern technologies in XX centuries. On the other hand, the experience of using technology in industry began to have a positive effect on the training of qualified forces and the spread of technology. The USA and Turkey continued actively help the development of Turkish forces.

There is an agreement with the United States "Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement", which is directly related to military production. An example of technological cooperation between Turkey and the United States is the state-owned company TUSAŞ (Turkish Aviation Industry). This organization was established in 1973 to create a modern base for the production of military and civil aviation in the country. The company's capital is 55% owned by the Treasury, and 45% by the Air Force Strengthening Fund.

The property was transferred to this company from the Merten plant, located near the US military base near Ankara. Although TUSAŞ planned to start with the production of civilian

aircraft, so far it has been assembling F-16 military aircraft, as well as fuselage parts for aircraft of the US Air Force.

In May 1996, Turkish President S. Demirel held a meeting with representatives of the military sector of Turkish industry, plans for the development of the national military industry were examined. At the meeting, a document “Politics and Strategy of the Military Industry” was approved by the government.

This 25-year program included a set of measures aimed at increasing the interest of national manufacturers in investing and capitalizing in the military sector of industry and reducing Turkey’s dependence on Western European partners in the production of modern types of weapons and military equipment, and also determined the needs of the Armed Forces Turkey in them.

According to the new strategy for the development of the military industry, at the first stage, with the support of the state, it was planned to create new industrial enterprises with a focus on the production of military products, which the Turkish armed forces need (see: Table 2.1).

Table 2.1.

Turkey's needs for armaments by 2021

a) ground forces

Weapon type	amount	Allocated funds (total amount)
Helicopters	150	60 billion dollars
rocket systems	180	
tanks	627	
wheeled vehicles	48.564	

b) air force

Weapon type	amount	Allocated funds (total amount)
combat aircraft	640	
(fighter bomber)	79	
air defense planes	160	
raining aircraft	68	
transport aircraft	25	
		65 billion dollars

c) naval forces

Weapon type	amount	Allocated funds (total amount)
frigates	14	
destroyers	16	
missile boats	16	
submarines	9	
landing ships	35	
patrol aircraft	9	
		25 billion dollars

The new development strategy of the Turkish military industry at the first stage envisaged reducing external purchases of military products from 79% to 60%.

Currently, the bulk of the military products manufactured at the enterprises of the Turkish military industry are purchased for the needs of the national armed forces. In the last years of the 20th century, this share constantly increased, which stimulated manufacturers.

The volume of purchases of military products produced at national defense enterprises increased from 10% to 13% of the budget appropriations allocated for the needs of the armed forces.

Together with deductions from funds supporting the military industry and the armed forces, this amount at the beginning of 1997 amounted to about \$ 9 billion.

The leadership of Turkey in 2000 adopted a 30-year modernization program for the armed forces. The program provided for equipping the army with attack helicopters and new tanks. Under this program, 6 diesel submarines of the Prevez type and 5 frigates of the Barbaross type, as well as 12 patrol boats, were scheduled to enter the naval forces. Landing forces must be equipped with a new fire control system and target detection. In general, the defense industry of Turkey is technologically tightly connected with military-technical cooperation with the United States.

Most of the ongoing programs, including the 2000 program, were implemented in collaboration with the Americans. Therefore, one of the largest and most promising programs in these years was the participation of Turkish aviation industry enterprises in the development and production of the latest American F-35 combat aircraft.

In order to strengthen its position in Turkey and the region, the United States of America continued to provide military-technical assistance to Ankara after September 11, 2001. At the beginning of 2003 (on the eve of the second Gulf War) this assistance was promised for \$ 26 billion. In general, Turkey remained outside the scope of the US 63 billion military package provided to the Middle Eastern countries, which were, of course, due to the general distrust of these states after the Iraq crisis of 2003.

Nevertheless, since 2006, military-technical cooperation between the two countries has become more intense, which was also associated with positive changes in political relations. In April 2006, the United States approved plans to create three naval bases in Turkey. Two places were chosen for American bases: the ports of Iskenderun on the Mediterranean Sea and the Urla in the Aegean Sea.

The third base could be created in the port of Mordogan near the city of Izmir on the coast of the Aegean Sea. When choosing places for bases, the Americans proceeded from the possibility of using the existing Turkish ports and creating new ones on their basis, since there it was planned to base large-tonnage vessels, large warships, including aircraft carriers. Washington initially sought to deploy one of the bases on the Black Sea coast of Turkey, but was refused because Ankara opposed the violation of the Montreux Convention (1936), which regulates the rules of navigation in the Black Sea Straits.

The new US bases in Turkey were officially called "military sites." This technical trick, on the one hand, allowed Ankara and Washington to avoid concluding a new intergovernmental agreement on defense cooperation to replace the one signed between them in 1980 and currently in force.

On the other hand, permission to create a military facility was issued by the head of government, while a parliamentary decision was required to open a military base. It should be noted that in Turkey there are up to 25 American military facilities, including nuclear weapons depots.

Ankara in 2005 proposed to create the headquarters of the NATO rapid deployment forces in Istanbul and include the Balkan, the Caucasus and Central Asia in its area of responsibility.

The development of the Turkish Air Force was also associated with the country's participation in the YSF (Single Attack Fighter) program for the development of a new generation F-35 multi-purpose combat aircraft. According to the 2005 agreement, over the next 20 years, Turkey plans to receive about 100 F-35A fighters for a total of \$ 10.7 billion (first deliveries from 2014). As an interim decision, in 2007 a decision was made to purchase 30 units of F-16C block 50 fighters for \$ 1.78 billion (deliveries since 2011). In October 2006, the US Agency for International Military Cooperation approved a draft contract for the supply of 42 General Electric F-110-129 spare engines,

launchers for air-to-air missiles, helmet-mounted targeting systems, radar stations and complexes to Turkey electronic warfare.

One of the most important pieces of equipment for the new aircraft is Link 16 MIDS/LVT communication equipment installed on fighter jets and Link 16 ground stations. This equipment, generally accepted for the USA and NATO countries, allows for uninterrupted real-time communication through a large number of channels voice and data communications. According to the 2006 agreement, the total transaction between the United States and Turkey amounted to \$ 2.9 billion.

In the structure of military-technical ties between Turkey and the West, has a special place so far has been occupied by Israel - the main ally of the United States in the Middle East. In December 1996, the extremely important Military Cooperation Agreement was signed. In addition to this basic agreement, 12 protocols were signed in various areas of cooperation in this area.

Despite significant problems and even disagreements in Turkish-American political relations, the cooperation between the two countries in the military-technical sphere remains at a high level, which once again proves the interconnection of US geopolitics and Turkey's regional strategy at the present stage of international relationship.

CHAPTER VIII: WATER ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TURKEY

Today, the basins of more than 260 world rivers are divided between two or more countries, and in the absence of clear agreements or institutions, changing these basins can cause serious complications in interstate relations.

In the modern world, Middle East, as a source of hydrocarbon resources and the Eastern Mediterranean as a way of transportation, have a strategic importance for the most developed economies in the world. This fact makes the economies of Western countries dependent on stability in the region.

There are dangerous international hotbeds of tension: (Turkish-Syrian, Iran-Iraqi, Greek-Turkish, war in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Middle East conflict).

The tension in interstate relations in the region is brought not only by political and territorial problems, but also by “water” conflicts, which are the most acute for this region.

In general, over the past 50 years, 507 “water” conflicts have been noted; 21 times, it came to military action. The UN draws attention to specific basins that may become the subject of controversy in the coming years. Along with the usual "bone of contention" - Lake Chad and the rivers Brahmaputra, Ganges, Zambezi, Limpopo, and Mekong, Senegal - in the UN report on world water conflicts, Araz, Irtysh, Kura, and Ob are mentioned.

In 1975, the dam built in Syria with the help of the USSR blocked the Euphrates, Iraq moved troops to the border, and only UN intervention prevented the war. In 1990, Iraq was on the verge of war with Turkey, when it reduced the flow of the Euphrates. In 1994, Egyptian troops entered Sudan to secure control of the Nile, from which almost all of Egypt use water. Soon, Egypt and Sudan united against Ethiopia, which decided to increase the withdrawal of water from the Nile. In 2002, Israel

threatened to use military force against Lebanon if it built dams in the upper Jordan.

Even in those regions that have long been considered well provided with water resources, water problems have arisen. Noticeable population growth, and increased economic activity, of which water is an integral component, and climate change, have caused water scarcity problems.

A feature of water resources, unlike other natural goods, is that they are interconnected in space, there are no unbreakable boundaries between them, and their flow depends on the time of year. In this regard, the problems of the distribution of water resources are an additional challenge. An even more difficult situation arises when water resources are divided between several states; these are the so-called transboundary (international) water resources, as in the case of the Euphrates River.

It is clear to everyone that water resources along with clean air, food and energy are the main source of human existence. At present, water supply is beginning to turn into one of the global problems, since an avalanche-like increase in production and a three-fold increase of the population of the Earth led to sevenfold increase in water demand in the XX century.

This problem is especially acute for Arab countries, most of which are occupied by deserts. Although the water situation in most parts of the world is complicated, especially in the four regions associated with the rivers Aral, Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, Jordan. Of these four regions, three are in the countries of the Arab world.

If in 1960 in this region per capita accounted for 3.3 thousand cubic meters per year. m. of consumed water, now this indicator has dropped to 1.3 thousand cubic meters. Even such states as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, where 2.7 thousand, 1.4 thousand and 1.1 thousand cubic meters, respectively, per inhabitant per year. m, belong to the category of countries with low and very low water supply.

By 2025, 90% of the region's states may be below the "poverty line" in terms of water availability. In the largest country in the Middle East - Egypt, whose population is 85 million people, currently 90 million people can be provided with water. However, by 2025, when the population of the ARE will increase to 100 million people, the situation will change for the worse. By 2050, even in the best position in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, there will be only 1.3 thousand, 1 thousand and 0.6 thousand cubic meters per person per year. m. of water, respectively, while in Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait - 24, 14 and 3 cubic meters.

Another country that has water problems is Turkey. The country is divided into 26 water pools. In Turkey, it is estimated at 186 km³ / year, of which from 28.4% (52.8 km³ / year) to 32.2% (52.94) falls on the country's largest basin, the Tigris (21.33 km³ / year) and the Euphrates (31.61 km³ / year), or the combined river basin of the Tigris-Euphrates.

Back in the 90s the 20 th century, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gali recognized that a new war in the Middle East will be associated with water. Today, the Islamic State in Iraq already uses water resources as weapons. Terrorists forced Iraqi government to deliver huge amounts of water to unoccupied part of Anbar province.

In Turkey, a country that is an important country in the region, the idea of using the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates arose in the first half of the 20th century. Then there were separate projects for the construction on these rivers of various structures for irrigation and hydropower generation. In the 80s. the twentieth century, they were combined into a single - "Southeast Anatolia" (GAP). In 1975, Turkey needed to fill the reservoir of the Keban reservoir after the construction of the dam of the same name was completed, while Syria filled the Tabka Reservoir. As a result, a crisis arose due to unacceptably low water levels in the Euphrates in Iraq. Another major conflict took place in the early 90's. in the xx century, turkey filled the Ataturk

reservoir, limiting the flow of the Euphrates, in response to which the Syrian and Iraqi governments expressed extreme discontent. The crisis of 1996 occurred due to the commissioning of the Birejik hydroelectric station in Turkey. Syria and Iraq stated that this would undoubtedly affect the quantity and quality of water. Countries appealed to the League of Arab States and European companies to stop funding Turkish projects.

Another important source of water in the region is Jordan. The Jordan River is a water resource around which the most significant disputes occur. The six-day war of 1967, which radically changed the strategic balance of forces in the region, provided Israel with the opportunity to control the hydropower of territories located upstream. The Arab countries threatened to interrupt Israel's water supply several times because the Jewish state began the construction of an aqueduct in the 1950s to transport water from the Jordan to Israel.

The three main sources of Jordan are located, respectively, in Lebanon (Al-Hasbani), in Israel (Dan) and in Syria (Golan Heights, Banias). In Jordan, in addition, there are numerous underground springs that flow to Israel. Israel does not have such a tense relationship; the Hashemite kingdom is a traditional ally of the West and supports its policy in the region. Hezbollah, in turn, believes that Lebanon is not able to properly use its water resources because the Israelis impede this.

Also at the present stage, the emergence of South Sudan on the one hand and the Arab revolutions on the other, have had a significant impact on the use of water resources in the region.

The activities of desalination plants are inextricably linked to emissions of carbon dioxide and heated sludge, which merges back into the sea, which, together with the intense evaporation characteristic of this area, affects the level of salinity of the water. The salinity of the water of the Persian Gulf today has increased to 47 ppm compared to 32 ppm 30 years ago. According to a report by Swedish experts published in early 2012, the water

level in the seven main water basins of Syria will be halved by 2025, which will cause a significant water shortage.

It is expected that by 2050 the amount of precipitation in Syria will decrease by about 20-25%, which in turn will lead to an increase in the rate and amount of evaporation and a decrease in flow in the Euphrates River. Turkey currently uses 35% of the Euphrates and a small portion of the Tigris. Should Turkey increase water consumption in the Euphrates and Tigris, Iraq and Syria will face severe water shortages.

Thus, water has become another urgent problem in the modern world. "Water" conflicts arising in the region not only affect interstate relations, but also can grow from regional to global - the third world war. Moreover, countries that control water reserves at the same time have the opportunity to exert significant pressure in resolving political issues.

CONCLUSION

Today Turkey plays a big role not only in the region, but also in all political events in the world.

Turkey is actively involved in the political events of the region, conducting numerous military operations. Of course, after events of Arab Spring, the role of Turkey in the region has increased many times.

Turkey has close military-technical cooperation with the USA, however, the Turkish government was able to minimize the country's dependence on the White House.

The textbook also highlights the trade and economic relations of Turkey with the United States, Russia, Azerbaijan, Japan and many other countries. Turkey's economy grew for last years.

In this book was written about all directions of internal and external policy of Turkish government.

The chapter on water problems in the region is also interesting. According to experts, the water problem will become one of the main reason for the start of another world war in the future.

The beginning of clarifying the details of Turkey's modern foreign policy was laid by Ahmet Davutoglu in 2014-2016 ("zero problem" project with neighbors).

It would be correct to emphasize that the events of the Arab Spring, in fact, challenged the intensification of Turkey's foreign policy in the region, thus creating a favorable situation for promoting the ideas of the formation of an Islamic state by Turkey.

Turkey's long aspiration (since September 12, 1963, the moment of signing the Ankara Agreement) towards the EU, the EU's refusal to full-fledged membership of Turkey led the Turkish government's foreign policy orientation towards the countries of the Middle East.

Turkey, which was an active conductor of Western European ideas in the post-Soviet region after the collapse of the USSR, a

country whose policy in the CIS countries was actively supported by the United States in the 90s., today is an adversary for the White House.

Firstly, official Ankara has positioned itself as an elder brother in the Middle East, in particular, after the events of the Arab Spring, using the Islamic factor for this and declaring itself the leader of the Sunni Ummah in the region.

Secondly, after the Arab uprisings of the 21st century, begins an open confrontation with Egypt. After the overthrow of the H. Mubarak regime, Turkey sees Egypt as its rival, because the Egyptian government shows its desire for leadership in every possible way by building close relations with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Although the policy of Egypt cannot be called as multifaceted, clear and far-sighted as the Turkish one.

In Libya, Turkey is also pursuing its policy to stabilize the domestic political situation in the country, defending the side of the legitimate government, speaking out against Haftar. It's no secret that many people criticize Turkey's policy in Libya.

However, modern Turkey, as the leading country of not only the region, but perhaps the entire Muslim world, is obliged to pursue a multi-vector policy, preventing foreign forces from infiltrating their positions in any countries of the region, trying to recreate the colonial policy.

For example, important to note Turkish-Israeli relations. The scale of the development of Turkey's relations with Israel is not constant. In 2010, the Mavi Marmara incident took place between Turkey and Israel. This conflict caused a complication of the situation in the Middle East, although Turkey became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel in 1949. At the same time, today we again observe the trend of Turkey's rapprochement with Israel, thanks to the mediation of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev. By the way, what gives us the opportunity to emphasize the versatility and flexibility of Azerbaijan's foreign policy.

The invasion of Turkish troops in 2015 on the territory of Iraq further strengthened the attempts of the Turkish government in the fight against all terrorist groups financed by the West to destabilize the situation in the Middle East, as well as to dismember the territory of Turkey, as events show, the “Eastern Question” is very relevant for European countries with a colonial past.

In the Persian Gulf region, Turkey was also able to strengthen its position. In 2017, after the start of a scandal between the official Doha and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, Turkey provided its political assistance to Qatar. The military presence of the Turks in the Gulf led to the stabilization of the political situation.

It should be emphasized the importance of Turkish-American relations in world politics. After participating in the Korean War (1950-1953), Turkey becomes a member of NATO, one of the allies of the United States. After the disintegration of the USSR, Turkey becomes for the United States a conductor of Western European ideas in the post-Soviet region.

There are frictions between these states that cause concern in the international arena at the present stage. The demonstrative conflict with Donald Trump over Russian S-400s is a clear example. The leadership of the White House threatened official Ankara with sanctions, and Turkey put on the agenda the issue of the existence of American military bases in Turkey.

Official Ankara is well aware of the importance of these bases for the United States, given the country's special geostrategy. As events show, today Turkey is becoming a key state in the Middle East and it becomes impossible to ignore its importance in the region. Turkey has a special strategic position in the region and this allows it to control the Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus.

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East and it becomes impossible to ignore its importance in the region. Turkey has a special strategic position in the region and this allows it to control the Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus.

Turkey's policy has an ever-increasing influence on the vast Eurasian space at the present stage. Thanks to the new trends in Turkey's foreign policy, the foundations of the country's multi-vector policy are being developed, which is very important for all Muslim countries. It is safe to say that in the current political conditions, Turkey is increasingly strengthening its positions not only in the region, but also outside its borders.

The presented textbook should help students in studying the foreign and domestic policy of Turkey, in understanding the relationship between Turkey and the countries of the region, as well as outside the region and help to analyze the most important events in politics at the present stage.

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Aliyeva-Mammadova Gunel

**FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY
AT THE PRESENT STAGE (1990-2019)**

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Redaksiya ünvanı: Bakı şəh., Mətbuat prospekti, 529-cu məh.

Tel.: +994 50 209 59 68

+994 55 209 59 68

+994 12 510 63 99

e-mail: zengezurda1868@mail.ru

